The fundamental purpose of the U.S. was to ensure the integrity and vitality of its free society which was founded upon the dignity and worth of the individual. The attainment of this purpose in the context of the post war world situation required the containment of the Soviet system and the development of a healthy international community. The U.S. felt the need to prevent the Soviet Union from any further “aggression” which would lead to the extension of the communist territories. Thus the U.S. began to orient itself towards a long term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies. The U.S. decided to confront the Russians with unalterable counterforce wherever they encroached upon the interests of a peaceful and stable world. As the prospect of defeat was the only sure means of deterring Soviet “aggression”, the U.S. thought that it had to be prepared to wage atomic and biological warfare if necessary. The U.S. also believed that it could frustrate the Soviet design for world domination by substantiating the integrity and vitality of the U.S. system through demonstrating the superiority of the idea of freedom by its constructive application and changing the world situation by means short of war. The U.S. took up the responsibility to organize and enlist the energies and resources of the “free world” for creating a situation in the “free world” to which the Kremlin would be compelled to adjust. Thus U.S. began its efforts to create in the minds of potential adversaries and allies and the American people, the attitudes which would facilitate the evolution of a congenial international environment for the U.S. This had to be accomplished by restoring self-confidence in nations threatened by Soviet expansionism. Hence President Truman committed the U.S. to support “free peoples” who were resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures. Subsequently the U.S. launched the Marshall Plan in order to strain Moscow’s control over Europe by making the war-ravaged economies of the European country’s independent centers of power through economic reconstruction, and thus mitigating conditions which made indigenous communism popular. But it was soon recognized that military security was an essential prerequisite for Europe’s economic recovery. Hence in order to maintain balance of power in Europe and deter any aggression, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was created. Thus, through its containment policy the U.S. sought to block any further expansion of Soviet Power. The U.S. aimed at reducing the power and influence of the U.S.S.R. to limits which would no longer constitute any threat to other nations. The U.S. also emphasized the need for a political offensive against the Soviet Union and to expose the falsities or Soviet system to the world. Thus, it was necessary that the U.S. and its allies had to attain an overall technical and military superiority over Soviet Union and its allies. The objective of all these was the creation of a situation to which the Kremlin would find it expedient to accommodate.

The communist victory in China convinced the U.S. of the urgency of containing communism in Asia. The U.S. policy instruments which were developed to meet the communist challenges in Europe were applied to meet the communist challenges in Asia also. With the outbreak of Korean War, the U.S. foreign policy shifted from a stricter anti-Soviet orientation to a broader anti-communist orientation. Containment came to be understood as aimed at all communists. All communists everywhere were considered as equally dangerous. Hence the U.S. gradually decided to create difficult problems for international communism through covert operations. Covert operations were to be conducted for discrediting the prestige and reducing the strength and control of international communism throughout the world. It also decided to strengthen the orientation of nations towards the U.S. and increasing their capacity to resist international communism. The U.S. also decided to create and promote underground resistance and overt and guerrilla operations in areas controlled or threatened by international communism. The basic U.S. security objectives in Asia included the development of strong and stable non-communist governments in the nations of Asia from preventing further communist expansion and the gradual reduction and eventual elimination of the preponderant Soviet power and influence in Asia. By 1954, the U.S. called for reducing the power of China in Asia even at the risk of war. The U.S. decided to protect its position and restore its prestige in the Far East through a new initiative in Southeast Asia for preventing any further gains for communism. The U.S. felt the need for negotiating a Southeast Asia security treaty which would not limit the U.S. freedom for using nuclear weapons or for stationing U.S. forces in Southeast Asia. Moreover the U.S. expressed its willingness and readiness to provide all the possible support for the legitimate local governments of Southeast Asia for defeating local communist subversion or rebellion. Regarding Indochina the U.S. decided to defeat the communist “aggression” in order to maintain friendly non-communist governments in Cambodia, Laos and South Vietnam. For this the U.S. was ready to make arrangements with the Associated States of Indochina and other interested states of the area to continue the war against the communists, if the French accepted an unsatisfactory settlement with the Vietminh communist forces. Moreover the U.S. wanted to prevent a communist victory through the all-Vietnam elections. It favored military victory against the Vietminh communist forces in Vietnam. The U.S. organized SEATO for preventing any further communist expansion in Southeast Asia. The U.S. planned to transform Vietnam into a redoubt in the implementation of the containment policy. An independent non-communist South Vietnam was considered as essential for the global U.S. security interests. Thus the U.S. foreign policy actions in Vietnam were aimed at attaining this specific objective of an independent non-communist South Vietnam.

The U.S. was vitally concerned about the Indochinese region since 1940. The U.S. foreign policy towards Indochina during Second World War was characterized by “ambivalence”. Of the three Indochinese states of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, Vietnam was considered as the most important by the U.S. By 1945 the Vietminh became the dominant political force in Vietnam. On September 2, 1945 Ho Chi Minh proclaimed independence of Vietnam from the French rule. As the U.S. needed a strong French ally in Europe and in the Far East, it did not oppose the restoration of ‘French sovereignty’ in Indochina. The return of the French created an explosive situation in Vietnam. Thus, by the end of 1946, the French and the Vietminh were engaged in an all-out war. The U.S. regarded the war as a matter for French resolution. On February 2, 1950 the French announced the formal ratification of the independence of the Vietnamese. Thus, when the Republic was formally established the U.S. granted diplomatic recognition the Bao Dai government and started providing assistance to the French and the Bao Dai government. Hence by 1952 the U.S. bore 40 percent of the cost of the French – Vietminh war. Moreover, the Eisenhower Administration gave firm assurance of continued assistance to the French. But on May 7, 1954 the French forces were defeated by the Vietminh communist forces in Dien Bien Phu. Subsequently Vietnam was provisionally partitioned along the 17^th parallel, into North Vietnam and South Vietnam. In June, 1954 the Eisenhower Administration sent a team to Vietnam to conduct covert operations in Vietnam. In the aftermath of the Geneva conference, the major U.S. objective in Vietnam was to set up a stable South Vietnamese government.

In October, 1954 President Eisenhower offered direct American aid to the Diem government. During 1955-56 periods Diem refused to cooperate in arranging and holding the general elections called for in the Geneva accords. The U.S. accepted Diem’s refusal. The U.S. objective was reunification of Vietnam under an anti-communist leadership. Hence by 1956, the Eisenhower Administration began the process of nation building in South Vietnam. By 1957 insurgency against the Diem government began in South Vietnam. Diem’s counter measures increased popular antagonism towards his government. The official American position was that North Vietnam manipulated the entire war. Hence the U.S. began sending military advisors to South Vietnam in order to train the South Vietnamese in counterinsurgency warfare techniques. In response to the Chinese and Soviet support for the “Wars of National Liberation”, the Kennedy Administration became preoccupied with counterinsurgency. Thus the U.S. conducted covert operations against the Hanoi regime, increased American aid and advisors to South Vietnam and thus boosted the morale of South Vietnamese army. It also authorized the use of defoliants and herbicides in South Vietnam. Meanwhile Diem’s authoritarian policies had alienated the people from his government. Hence Kennedy Administration concluded that the war against the Vietminh communist forces could not be won under the aegis of the Diem government. Hence the U.S. supported a coup by the South Vietnamese Generals which led to the assassination of Diem heightened its responsibilities and deepened its commitments towards South Vietnam. By the end of 1963, according to the U.S. assessment, the situation in South Vietnam was extremely disturbing. Gradually the U.S. increased its aid to South Vietnam. It also increased covert operations against North Vietnam. NSAM 288 of 1964 set the U.S. objective as an independent, non-communist South Vietnam. On August 4, 1964 in connection with the Tonkin Gulf incidents, the U.S. conducted its first direct attack on North Vietnam. On August 5, 1964 the Congress overwhelmingly, supported President Johnson’s policies by passing the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. By September, 1964 John Administration reached a general consensus that air attack against North Vietnam would be necessary to prevent a communist victory in South Vietnam. Gradually the U.S. began escalating military pressure against North Vietnam through sustained bombing for forcing the North to halt its support for insurgency in the South. The first U.S. combat troops entered South Vietnam in March, 1965. Gradually it became clear that bombing of North Vietnam alone would not prevent the collapse of South Vietnam. Thus the U.S. troops assumed the responsibility to defend certain critical areas in South Vietnam and to convince the Viet Cong that they could not win in South Vietnam. But the strategy tacitly yielded initiative to the Viet Cong. Hence in June, 1965 General Westmoreland was given the authority to commit U.S. forces anywhere in South Vietnam. The U.S. goal began to be defeating Viet Cong rather than denying them victory. This left the U.S. with an open-ended military commitment. The American troop level kept mounting. The U.S. escalated pressure on North Vietnam through regular saturation bombing. The political objective was to bring the Viet Cong to the conference table. Gradually the costs of the war increased and anti-war movement grew at home. The Tet offensive of January 30-31, 1968 caused a reevaluation of the U.S. objectives in Vietnam. The Johnson Administration had to devise a new direction in its Vietnam policy. Hence President Johnson asked C.M. Clifford to undertake a complete assessment of the U.S. commitment in Vietnam. The Clifford study suggested the Vietnamization of the war. Thus, gradually the U.S. policy became oriented towards Vietnamization, de-escalation and a negotiated settlement of the conflict.

On March 31, 1968 President Johnson announced that he would not substantially add to the number of U.S. troops already in south and declared the halting of air and naval bombardment of North Vietnam. Thus, formal peace talks opened in Paris on May 13, 1968. When the peace talks deadlocked John, Administration stepped up its military pressure against North Vietnam. Peace talks resumed on January 25, 1969. With the advent of Nixon Administration Vietnamization and phased withdrawal of American forces became major aspects of American policy in Vietnam. But the American objective persisted to be an independent, non-communist South Vietnam. The U.S. aimed at convincing Hanoi and Viet Cong that a conventional military victory over South Vietnam was outside the realm of possibility. Through the use of U.S. air force, massive buildup of South Vietnam’s military strength and application of military pressure against North Vietnam, the U.S. attempted to force Hanoi to a negotiated settlement of the war. On April 30, 1970 Nixon sent U.S. combat troops into Cambodia for destroying the communist bases and supplies in order to stop communist infiltration into South Vietnam. On May 2, 1970 the bombing of North Vietnam was temporarily resumed. In February, 1971 Nixon again expanded the war by approving a major ground operation into Laos. In response to a massive North Vietnamese offensive across the Demilitarized zone, on April 6, 1972 Nixon ordered the resumption of full-scale bombing of North Vietnam and imposed a naval blockade on North Vietnam by mining the major ports of North Vietnam. Existing stock piles of supplies in North Vietnam were destroyed and supply lines were interdicted. In the meanwhile, Nixon visited Peiking and Moscow. On August 1, 1972 peace talks resumed in Paris, but the negotiations deadlocked again. The U.S. resumed bombing North Vietnam on December 18, 1972. The bombing lasted for eleven days. It was the heaviest American bombing of the entire Vietnam War. Thus, peace talks resumed on January 8, 1973 and a peace agreement was finally signed on January 27, 1973 by the representatives of U.S., North Vietnam, South Vietnam and National Liberation Front of South Vietnam. The Nixon Administration reiterated the American commitment to provide continued American aid to South Vietnam. But after the agreement North Vietnam started infiltrating its troops in to South Vietnam. On June 30, 1973 Congress voted for immediate cessation of all military activity and cut off funds for all military activities in and over Indochina effective from August 15, 1973. The enactment of the War Powers Resolution of November 7, 1973 which formalized Congressional oversight over the President’s use of American troops abroad prevented Nixon from taking any further action in Vietnam. When American aid was cut back, the political and economic problem of South Vietnam sharply aggravated. South Vietnamese provinces began to fall to the North Vietnamese communist forces one after another. On April 21, 1975 the last South Vietnamese defense line before Saigon was captured by the communists. On April 23, 1975 U.S. President Gerald R. Ford proclaimed that the Vietnam War was finished as far as the U.S. was concerned. On April 30, 1975 President Duong Van Minh of South Vietnam announced the unconditional surrender of the government of Republic of Vietnam. Thus, Vietnam was reunified under a communist government.

In analyzing the American foreign policy in Vietnam, the basic nature or the identity of the actor was dealt with by examining the historical consciousness of the U.S. The Americans believed in wealth and prestige as desirable goals. Though they believed in the ethical or fundamental equality of all, they had contempt for the theory of permanent equality of property. They believed that the state should protect the property rights of the individuals and that it should promote economic opportunities and free enterprise. Christian religion had great influence on the beliefs of Americans. Most of them believed that God was the absolute sovereign ruler of all creations. They considered America as a redeemer nation. What the Americans had in common was only the American creed which included the political ideas of equality, liberty, individualism, constitutionalism and democracy. The American creed constituted the very basis of American national identity. The fundamental purpose of the U.S. was to assure the integrity and vitality of its free society founded upon the dignity and worth of the individual. By the end of the Second World War, the Americans had concluded that preventing aggression anywhere in the world was essential for its own national security. Such beliefs and values constituted the very core of the historical consciousness of the U.S. by the year 1950. On the basis of this historical consciousness the Americans perceived the expansionist tendencies of the international communism under the leadership of Kremlin as a grave threat to its national security because the creed and practices of international communism were irreconcilable with the principles of the U.S. faith. According to the U.S. the basic tenet of the Soviet Communist thought system was the original communist thesis of the innate antagonism between capitalism and socialism. According to the U.S. perception the Soviet leaders believed in the basic badness of capitalism, in the inevitability of its destruction and the obligation of the proletariat to assist the destruction. The Soviet leaders also believed that permanent peaceful coexistence of communist and capitalist nations was impossible. They also believed that the integrity and vitality of U.S. society had to be destroyed, if they had to attain their objective of world domination. With the victory of communists in China and outbreak of Korean War, the communist everywhere began to be considered as equally dangerous. Thus, the defense of Southeast Asia from communist domination, prevention of the communist victory in Indochina and the maintenance of an independent, non-communist South Vietnam were considered as essential for the American security interests. On the basis of its image of a grave threat from the international communism, the U.S. oriented its actions towards protecting its basic interest of national security and welfare of the people. Thus the U.S. initiated the policy of containing the Soviet communist system and the development of a healthy international community. As the prospect of a defeat was the only sure means of deterring Soviet “aggression”, the U.S. was prepared to wage atomic and biological warfare it necessary. With the victory of communists in China and the outbreak of Korean War, the containment policy was directed against all communist everywhere. The U.S. decided to prevent any further gains for communism in Asia. Hence the U.S. actions were gradually oriented towards a military victory over the Vietminh communist forces in Indochina in order to prevent the communist domination of Southeast Asia. Thus the U.S. favored a military victory over the Vietminh in Vietnam. The primary objective of the U.S. in Vietnam was an independent, non-communist South Vietnam. The U.S. foreign policy actions in Vietnam were aimed at attaining this specific objective.

Thus, in analyzing the American Foreign Policy in Vietnam War 1950 – 1975, it was essential to take into account the historical consciousness of the U.S., its perceptions of the post war world situation and how it oriented its actions towards its perceived ‘image’ of the situation. Such a study was made possible by applying the Ideology Framework to the case of American foreign policy in Vietnam War 1950 – 1975 by identifying the various aspects of the action process in the case. Thus, the case of American Foreign Policy in Vietnam War, 1950 – 1975 was studied by identifying the historical consciousness of the U.S., its perception of the post war international situation, its action orientation towards it perceived “image” of the world situation and also its foreign policy actions in Vietnam War during 1950-1975. Such a study would not have been possible if the analysis was restricted to a mere description of the American foreign policy in Vietnam war 1950-1975. But by dealing also with the historical consciousness of the U.S., its perceptions of the post war world situation and its action orientation towards its perceived image of the world situation, the study was placed in its proper perspective and was made more comprehensive and meaningful. Thus, the Ideology Framework is useful for analyzing foreign policies of states.

CONCLUSION

In this long study, the meaning and structure of ideology, world view, etc. are dealt with. The historical background, religious mind and economic mind of the US is traced. The major part of the book gives concrete evidence of the US determination to meet the challenges of the cold war period. It is in effect a psycho-analysis of the nation. Administrations will change. But the values upon which the nation is built are still burning alive in the spirit and mind of the people. If the US did not show that much of determination to resist the communist advance, the face and nature of the world today would have been much worse.