It is the foreign policy actions of states which determine the nature of international relations. Foreign policy actions of states could be explained in term of various hypothetical factors. But ultimately a foreign policy action originates from a decision taken by the decision makers of the state who act in the name of the state. Hence only those factors which are taken into account by the decision makers could be said to have influenced the foreign policy action. Hence decision making is an important state to be reckoned with in the foreign policy analysis. The major approaches or theories which attempt to explain how the decision-making process influences the foreign policy of a state include Disjointed Incrementalism, Game Theory, Cybernetic Perspective, Allison’s three models such as Rational Actor Model, Organizational Process Model and the Bureaucratic Politics Model. Though the models attempted to explain various processes through which foreign policy decisions are arrived at, they do not give due attention to the fact that the entire decision-making process takes place in a unique psychological environment. The external factors can influence a foreign policy decision only if they are perceived and taken into account by the concerned decision makers. The decision makers’ perception of a given situation, the “image” they derive from the perception of the situation and their response to their “image” of the situation, all vary in accordance with the nature of the dispositional setting or the psychological environment of the decision makers. As the decision makers act upon the “image” of a given situation which they received from their perception of the situation, in foreign policy analysis it is necessary to consider how the decision makers perceived a particular situation and what “image” they got from the perception of the situation.

            Yet none of the significant studies in the field of foreign policy analysis have developed an adequate framework for foreign policy analysis which gives due importance to the decision makers’ perception of the given situation. Hence the major objective of the present study is to initiate an effort towards formulating a framework which can provide due importance to the decision makers’ perception of the situation. In the study the formulation of such a framework for foreign policy analysis is attempted through conceptualizing ideology, identifying historical consciousness, perception of the situation, action orientation and action as its major aspects and applying to foreign policy analysis.

II

            Ideology is studied by placing it in a historical perspective. Ideology has a historical anchorage. The rise of ideology corresponded to the breakdown of the traditional perspectives which characterized the age of monarchial absolutism. The political transformation from absolutist monarchy to liberal democracy provided amble scope for popular participation in political life. Gradually there arose a feeling that history could be molded and new social conditions could be created through man’s purposeful collective action. Hence political leaders began to use certain idea system to mobilize popular support for collective action in order to attain certain common objectives. Ideology was thus the product of the spread of democratic ideals and the politics of mass movements. The word ideology was coined by Destutt de Tracy in 1796. Originally it meant ‘science of ideas’. The tradition of the critique of religion and of the feudal political system initiated with disintegration of the medieval society, served as a background for Tracy’s introduction of the term ideology. Initially ideology was used as a means for discovering truth and dissolving illusions. But through Napoleon’s contemptuous usage the term ideology began to assume a pejorative meaning. Thus, gradually the original meaning of the term began to recede. Discussions about ideology could generally be classified into two broad domains of ‘ideology in knowledge’ and ‘ideology in politics’. While ‘ideology in knowledge’ is concerned with the ‘truth’ value of ideology, ‘ideology in politics’ is concerned with the functional value ideology. The Marxist conception of ideology or the critique of ideology tradition as a whole fall into the category of ‘ideology in knowledge’. For Marx ideology was a conscious or unconscious distortion of views and facts for making them to serve the interests of the holder of the view or the possessor of the facts. Thus, Marx’s concept of ideology designated a quality of thought. It was the attribute of any thought or idea which distorted reality. But the impact of the Marxist concept of ideology on modern politics cannot be considered profound. This is evident from the fact that even in the Marxist tradition; it was the Leninist rather than the Marxian usage of ideology that had its impact on contemporary political life. The Leninist usage of ideology falls into the category of ‘ideology in politics. In its ideology meant any scheme of thinking characteristic of a group or of a class. For Lenin ideology was a set of cognitions and theories which express the interest of a class. Through the practical political successes of Lenin and through the Leninist usage of ideology historically acquired a positive meaning.

            The positive concept of ideology can be fruitfully used in a political analysis if it is conceptualized with reference to the cognitive, affective and action-oriented parameters. An analysis of the various positive conceptualizations of ideology made it clear that ideology is a system of beliefs of a group of people. It has a conception of history. Hence it explains how the society has developed to its given state of affairs. It makes an interpretation about the nature of the collectively and the situation in which it is placed. It evaluates the judges the inadequacies of the past and present in the light of certain ideals and expectations. Thus, it identifies certain goals for the collectivity. In order to attain those goals for the collective interest of the people, it also prescribes a program of action. Thus, historical consciousness, perception of the situation, action orientation and action are generated as the major elements of ideology.

            The actors motive themselves for action by perceiving and evaluating the situation in the light of their historical experience and expectations. Thus, the actors, perceptions of a given situation are determined by their prepossessions and predispositions in relation to their past, present and future. These prepossessions and predispositions constitute the historical consciousness of a people or a state is constituted of its prepossessions such as culture, values, belief-systems and expectations about the future. The historical consciousness of a people constitutes their predispositions. The actor’s perception of particular situation is based on their historical consciousness of a society is shared by its members. Hence the way a decision maker perceives a given situation is greatly determined by the historical consciousness of the state or people. Thus, what the decision makers get as a result of their perception of the situation is only an “image” of the situation. The actors’ evaluation of the image of the situation generates certain interests for the actors which are to be fulfilled for their well-being. In order to fulfill their interests in the specific and evolving conditions, the actors formulate certain objectives which are to be attained through certain courses of action. Thus, in order to fulfill their interests, the actors orient themselves to certain courses of action which are efficacious enough to attain their objectives in the given situation. Thus, action orientation follows from the actors’ perception of the situation. Action orientation refers to the actors’ tendency to orient themselves towards certain courses of action for maintaining, altering or transforming a situation which caused the image which the actors have received from their perception of the situation, in order to bring about for themselves a favorable future state of affairs. The actors’ action orientation gradually leads to certain courses of action by the actors. This process through which the action comes into existence might be called the action process. Thus, the various elements or stages of the action process are historical consciousness, perception of the situation, action orientation and action. Since action is the product or the final stage in the action process, the various other constituent elements or stages of the action process are inherent in the action. Hence a particular action could be analyzed by identifying in it the various elements of the action process. This framework for the analysis of action might be called Ideology Framework. Because the framework is essentially formulated by using the major aspects of ideology, moreover as the action process is constituted of the major aspects of ideology, the Ideology Framework could be applied for analyzing social actions by identifying the elements of the action process in the actions. Every social action could be analyzed by using the Ideology Framework. Hence the Ideology Framework can be applied for analyzing the foreign policy actions of a state by identifying the various elements of the action process in them.

III

            In order to substantiate the viability of applying the Ideology Framework for foreign policy analysis, the case of American foreign policy in Vietnam 1950-1975 is studied. The Ideology Framework is applied for studying the case by identifying the historical consciousness of America by 1950, the American perception on the international communism as a threat with special reference to Vietnam, America’s action orientation towards the perceived threat of international communism with special reference to Vietnam and the American foreign policy actions in Vietnam War 1950 – 1975.

IV

            In analyzing the American foreign policy of Vietnam War, it is essential to study the historical consciousness of the people of the U.S. This is because the perceptions of the U.S. decision makers about the situation in Vietnam were determined by the historical consciousness of the U.S.  The decision makers, as member of the society, shared the prepossessions and predispositions of the society and made their perceptions about international communism and the specific situation in Vietnam through the prism of their historical consciousness. The historical consciousness of the people of the U.S. is studied by tracing their national experience of settling a vast continent by people of various ethnic origins, their religious experience, their political beliefs, values, expectations and their experience in foreign relations. The American culture is largely the product of interplay between the two major factors such as the inheritance, impulses and aspirations of the people of various races from different countries who arrived in America and the influences of the American national environment upon the people who arrived there. Improving the economic fortunes was the major impulse for immigration. The immigrants came to a huge, wild country rich with natural resources. Though the immigrants were few in number, the land available was in abundance. This combination of unutilized resources and the people with the incentive to use them shaped the social environment of the pioneer communities. The settlement of the frontier was a selective process. The frontier appealed more to the restless, ambitious and adventurous men of action. The abundance of land and resources made the settling easier and rewarding. Moreover, it facilitated the growth of individual freedom and social equality and promoted the attitudes of optimism and self-assurance. The westward expansion expanded the belief in popular rule and accelerated the trend towards social and political democracy. The social characteristics associated with the frontier tradition include optimism, materialism, competitiveness, equalitarianism and individualism. The frontiersman was mobile, versatile, inventive, wasteful and nationalistic. He scorned precedents and traditions. He was a practical opportunist concerned primarily with devising habits and institutions that would allow him to utilize most effectively the abundant available resources. Wealth and prestige were considered as desirable goods. No one wanted to see competition limited or equality institutionalized. Everyone wanted to be free from any interference and no one felt the need for any government. But the War of Independence convinced the American people about the need for a strong government. This attitude helped the formation of a federal constitution. The constitution drafted by the Philadelphia Convention of 1787 was based on aristocratic and capitalistic principles. Hence while the aristocratic and moneyed classes unanimously supported the constitution, the agrarians opposed it. But the ultimate defeat of agrarianism was inevitable since men who were agrarians by conviction, not by expediency were rare. The austerity and self-discipline that agrarianism required were wholly contrary to the dynamic quality of will which characterized the American civilization in general. Hence as the Americans could not be content with the relatively static economy, they preferred the rewards and hazards of industrial capitalism. The Americans believed that the state should protect the property rights and that it should protect the property rights and that it should promote economic opportunity and free enterprise. Thus, ultimately the American economic system became capitalistic.

            Christianity had great impact on the lives of Americans from the early days of settling. The American colonies were influenced by Protestantism through the Puritan movement. The Puritans believed that they were the chosen people of God commissioned to fulfill the great mission in the world. They accepted Bible alone as their guide. Puritan character was a mixture of practicality and faith in the power of God. Puritans believed that they should serve God by following an occupation that served the world. It emphasized the ideals of respect for the individual and for the dignity of man, recognition of the ultimate authority of reason and allegiance to principles rather than to persons and to the doctrine of government by compact and by consent and to spiritual and moral democracy. The theology that most satisfactorily met the Puritan culture’s sense of affairs was that of John Calvin. The Calvinists believed that God was the absolute sovereign ruler of all creations and accepted Bible alone as their guide. The core of Calvinism was man’s sense of his own sinfulness and his consequent anxiety and fear of divine anger. Humans could do nothing to promote their salvation. The only hope was the grace of God. It believed in salvation by faith. It ensured that the man who trusted in the grace of God and the atonement made by Jesus on the Cross need no longer feel any anxiety on account of his sinfulness. Calvinism divided mankind into two groups: the elect and the damned. Those who had faith in God and obeyed the moral rules established by God might feel assured of their election. The rest of the mankind was damned. The Calvinist considered America as are redeemer nation. They considered if as the duty of the elect to impose their way of life upon the damned in order to see that the will of God was obeyed. There is relationship between the American religious experience and the success of democracy. The religious beliefs of the people of U.S. reinforced the values that determined the political goals. The two basic concepts of Christian belief such as sin and soul were helpful in promoting political equalitarianism and individualism in America. The dissenting pluralist tradition in religion strongly influenced the formation of a tradition of political dissent. The basic ideas of American political creed included equality, liberty, individualism, constitutionalism and democracy.

            The major value orientations of the American culture included activity and work, achievement and success, moral orientation, humanitarianism, efficiency and practicality, science and secular rationality, material comfort, progress, equality, freedom, democracy, external conformity, nationalism, patriotism, individual personality racism and related group superiority themes. Americans believed in the ethical or fundamental equality of all but had contempt for the theory of permanent equality of property. The basic objective of the U.S. policy was to defend and promote the fundamental values of the U.S. society. The fundamental purpose of the U.S. was to assure the integrity and vitality of its free society founded upon the dignity and worth of the individual.

            What the Americans had in common was only the American creed which included the political ideas of equality, liberty, individualism, constitutionalism and democracy. The American creed constituted the very basis of the American national identity. The national identity and the national existence were closely related to the adherence to the political ideals of the American creed. Hence the disillusionment with the political ideals of the American creed could threaten the national existence of the U.S. Americans believed that communism was a threat to their basic political ideals. Hence during the post war period, the American people began to perceive a grave threat to their welfare and national security from the communist expansionist tendencies under the leadership of Soviet Union and China.

            Isolationism served best the interests of the Republic in its early years. The Americans believed that their interests could only be damaged by excessive contact with the outside world. The geographic location of the U.S. and the great wealth of natural resources within its boundaries provided the basis for such an interpretation of national interest. But with the closing of the frontier, saturation of the home market and the rise of aggressive imperialism in Europe and Asia, more and more foreign involvement became necessary for the U.S. Thus, gradually American interests began to grow outside its boundaries. The post war U.S. foreign policy was greatly determined by the U.S. experience in the First and Second World Wars. Though the U.S. was reluctant to enter into both the World wars ultimately it had to defend its national security through military involvement. Thus the U.S. realized that its own security and well-being were inseparable from that of the other nations. Thus, arresting aggression anywhere at the earliest began to be considered as essential for its own national security. Hence the U.S. began to express its willingness to assume greater responsibilities in world affairs. Thus, gradually the U.S. tended to direct the events in its own choosing instead of waiting for them.

            Such economic, religious, political and foreign policy beliefs, values, habits and expectations constituted the historical consciousness of the U.S. This particular historical consciousness of the U.S. determined its perceptions about the post war world scenario.

V

            According to the U.S. perception, the fundamental tenet of the Soviet communist thought system was the original communist thesis of the innate antagonism between capitalism and socialism. The Soviet leaders believed in the basic badness of capitalism, in the inevitability of its destruction and the obligation of the proletariat to assist the destruction. They believed that the Soviet Union lived in an antagonistic, capitalistic encirclement. Hence, they also believed that permanent peaceful co-existence of communist and capitalist nations was impossible. They believed that the inherent conflicts of the capitalist world inevitably generate wars. The Soviet leaders believed that there would be a capitalistic intervention against U.S.S.R. which had to be prevented at all costs. They assumed that the conflict between Soviet Union and capitalist powers was inevitable and regarded themselves as the defenders of the communist faith. They believed that the battle between the socialist center and the capitalist center for the command of world economy would finally determine the fate of capitalism and of communism in the entire world. They adhered to the Marxian theory of ultimate destruction of capitalist states by communist states. They believed that it was their duty to prepare Soviet Union for the inevitable conflict. Hence the basic Soviet policies were designed for ensuring victory for Soviet Union in the ensuing struggle between communism and capitalism. The ultimate objective of the Soviet leadership was the domination of the world. Their immediate goal was the political conquest of the Western Europe. Elimination of any effective opposition to it and extension of their authority were considered essential for the attainment of the objective. The means employed by the Kremlin for this were limited only by considerations of expediency. Hence the soviet policies were directed towards the advancement of the relative strength of U.S.S.R. and reducing the strength and influence of the capitalist powers. Thus, Soviet leaders were increasing their military power and sphere of Soviet influences and were trying to waken and subvert their political opponents by every means at their disposal. However, they were not in a hurry to accomplish their purposes. They were ready to postpone the inevitable conflict in order to prepare Soviet Union for the clash. The resistance of the U.S. was recognized as the major obstacle to the attainment of their goals. For the Kremlin, the U.S. as the principal center of power in the non-Soviet world and the bulwark of opposition to Soviet expansion was the principal enemy whose integrity and vitality had to be subverted or destroyed if it had to achieve its objectives. As the existence of the idea of freedom was a constant threat to the foundation of the Soviet system, the Kremlin engaged the U.S. in a conflict between its design and the U.S. purpose. The fundamental purpose of the U.S. was to assure the integrity and vitality of its free society founded upon the dignity and worth of the individual. The strategy of the Kremlin was to undermine the complex forces of the U.S. and also of the rest of the “free world” upon which the U.S. power has based. To attain its objectives Kremlin sought to build up overwhelming military force. If the Kremlin were convinced that it could cause the downfall of the U.S. by one conclusive blow, it would seek that solution. Hence there was possibility for a surprise attack against the U.S. and piecemeal aggression against others. Thus, according to the U.S. perception, the Soviet leaders believed that the Soviet power would not be secure unless the way of life of the U.S. society was destroyed. Thus, the greatest single danger to the U.S. security emerged from the will and ability of the Soviet leadership to pursue policies harmful to the U.S.

            As Europe was considered as of paramount importance to U.S. security interests, Truman Administration’s policies were aimed at containing Soviet communist expansion in Europe. But the victory of the communists in China in 1949 made the U.S. aware of the vigor of communism in Asia and the urgency of containing it at the earliest. The extension of the communist authority in China was regarded as a grievous political defeat for the U.S. The conclusion of a defense treaty between Soviet Union and China in February, 1950 led Washington to the conclusion that henceforth it would have to deal with the Sino-Soviet bloc. The U.S. thought that if the Kremlin further extends the area under its domination, the U.S. would not be able to assemble a coalition adequate to confront the Kremlin with greater strength. Hence defeat of free institutions anywhere was considered as defeat anywhere. The U.S. believed that international communism could commander the military and economic might of the Soviet Union for its expansionist purposes. The U.S. opposed international communism because its creed and practices were antithetical and irreconcilable with the principles of the U.S. faith. North Korea’s invasion of South Korea confirmed the American view that Soviet Union would resort to war in order to attain its objectives if it thought it had a reasonably good chance of accomplishing them without a large risk to itself. The Chinese entry into the war confirmed the monolithic concept of communism. Thereafter the American thinking and policy making began to be dominated by a tendency to view the world wide “communist threat” in monolithic terms. Korean War marked the globalization of containment. It reinforced the trend towards seeing all communists everywhere as equally dangerous.

            Indochina was considered as the area where international communism most vigorously sought to expand. Thus, Indochina began to be perceived as an integral part of the broader struggle between the Soviet dominated communism and the so-called “free world”. The attempt of Ho Chi Minh to evict the French from Indochina was seen as the Southeast Asian manifestation of the communist world-wide aggressive intent. The French resistance to Ho Chi Minh was therefore begun to be viewed as an integral part of the containment of communism in that region of the world. Defense of Indochina was considered as essential for the defense of Southeast Asia. The communist domination of Southeast Asia would critically endanger the U.S. security interests. The loss of any single country of Southeast Asia to communism would lead to a swift submission or an alignment with communism by the remaining countries of the area unless effective and timely counter action was taken. Such an alignment with communism by the countries of Southeast Asia and in the longer term of the Middle East would endanger the stability and security of Europe. Security of Europe was perceived as essential for the security of the U.S. The primary threat to Southeast Asia would arise from the possibility that the situation in Indochina might deteriorate as a result of the weakening of the resolve of or as a result of the inability of the governments of France and of the Associated States of Indochina to continue to oppose the Vietnam. The U.S. concluded that a Vietminh victory in Vietnam would lead to the communist domination of Indochina. It Indochina goes to communism; Southeast Asia would go under the communist domination. Hence the U.S. believed that for preventing the communist domination of Southeast Asia, a military victory against the Vietminh in Indochina was essential. The French resistance to the Vietminh in Vietnam was considered as a crucial link in preventing the communist domination of Southeast Asia. But the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu resulted in a negotiated settlement which temporarily partitioned Vietnam at the 17^th parallel between the communist North Vietnam and the non-communist South Vietnam, at the Geneva Conference of 1954. The U.S. evaluated the Geneva Conference as potential disaster for the U.S. security interests in the Far East. It believed that as result of the Geneva Conference the communists had required an “advance salient” in Vietnam. Hence the U.S. came to the conclusion that the loss of South Vietnam would lead to the loss of Indochina. Thus, an independent, non-communist South Vietnam was considered as a test case of the U.S. determination to uphold its commitments and its capacity to meet the challenges posed by the communist strategy of the wars of national liberation by counterinsurgency warfare. The U.S. believed that the loss of South Vietnam to communism would complicate the task of preventing the spread of communism around the world and would in turn endanger the U.S. security. The U.S. oriented its actions towards this perceived image of the world situation.

VI

            The fundamental purpose of the U.S. was to ensure the integrity and vitality of its free society which was founded upon the dignity and worth of the individual. The attainment of this purpose in the context of the post war world situation required the containment of the Soviet system and the development of a healthy international community. The U.S. felt the need to prevent the Soviet Union from any further “aggression” which would lead to the extension of the communist territories. Thus the U.S. began to orient itself towards a long term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies. The U.S. decided to confront the Russians with unalterable counterforce wherever they encroached upon the interests of a peaceful and stable world. As the prospect of defeat was the only sure means of deterring Soviet “aggression”, the U.S. thought that it had to be prepared to wage atomic and biological warfare if necessary. The U.S. also believed that it could frustrate the Soviet design for world domination by substantiating the integrity and vitality of the U.S. system through demonstrating the superiority of the idea of freedom by its constructive application and changing the world situation by means short of war. The U.S. took up the responsibility to organize and enlist the energies and resources of the “free world” for creating a situation in the “free world” to which the Kremlin would be compelled to adjust. Thus U.S. began its efforts to create in the minds of potential adversaries and allies and the American people, the attitudes which would facilitate the evolution of a congenial international environment for the U.S. This had to be accomplished by restoring self-confidence in nations threatened by Soviet expansionism. Hence President Truman committed the U.S. to support “free peoples” who were resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures. Subsequently the U.S. launched the Marshall Plan in order to strain Moscow’s control over Europe by making the war-ravaged economies of the European country’s independent centers of power through economic reconstruction, and thus mitigating conditions which made indigenous communism popular. But it was soon recognized that military security was an essential prerequisite for Europe’s economic recovery. Hence in order to maintain balance of power in Europe and deter any aggression, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was created. Thus, through its containment policy the U.S. sought to block any further expansion of Soviet Power. The U.S. aimed at reducing the power and influence of the U.S.S.R. to limits which would no longer constitute any threat to other nations. The U.S. also emphasized the need for a political offensive against the Soviet Union and to expose the falsities or Soviet system to the world. Thus, it was necessary that the U.S. and its allies had to attain an overall technical and military superiority over Soviet Union and its allies. The objective of all these was the creation of a situation to which the Kremlin would find it expedient to accommodate.

            The communist victory in China convinced the U.S. of the urgency of containing communism in Asia. The U.S. policy instruments which were developed to meet the communist challenges in Europe were applied to meet the communist challenges in Asia also. With the outbreak of Korean War, the U.S. foreign policy shifted from a stricter anti-Soviet orientation to a broader anti-communist orientation. Containment came to be understood as aimed at all communists. All communists everywhere were considered as equally dangerous. Hence the U.S. gradually decided to create difficult problems for international communism through covert operations. Covert operations were to be conducted for discrediting the prestige and reducing the strength and control of international communism throughout the world. It also decided to strengthen the orientation of nations towards the U.S. and increasing their capacity to resist international communism. The U.S. also decided to create and promote underground resistance and overt and guerrilla operations in areas controlled or threatened by international communism. The basic U.S. security objectives in Asia included the development of strong and stable non-communist governments in the nations of Asia from preventing further communist expansion and the gradual reduction and eventual elimination of the preponderant Soviet power and influence in Asia. By 1954, the U.S. called for reducing the power of China in Asia even at the risk of war. The U.S. decided to protect its position and restore its prestige in the Far East through a new initiative in Southeast Asia for preventing any further gains for communism. The U.S. felt the need for negotiating a Southeast Asia security treaty which would not limit the U.S. freedom for using nuclear weapons or for stationing U.S. forces in Southeast Asia. Moreover the U.S. expressed its willingness and readiness to provide all the possible support for the legitimate local governments of Southeast Asia for defeating local communist subversion or rebellion. Regarding Indochina the U.S. decided to defeat the communist “aggression” in order to maintain friendly non-communist governments in Cambodia, Laos and South Vietnam. For this the U.S. was ready to make arrangements with the Associated States of Indochina and other interested states of the area to continue the war against the communists, if the French accepted an unsatisfactory settlement with the Vietminh communist forces. Moreover the U.S. wanted to prevent a communist victory through the all-Vietnam elections. It favored military victory against the Vietminh communist forces in Vietnam. The U.S. organized SEATO for preventing any further communist expansion in Southeast Asia. The U.S. planned to transform Vietnam into a redoubt in the implementation of the containment policy. An independent non-communist South Vietnam was considered as essential for the global U.S. security interests. Thus the U.S. foreign policy actions in Vietnam were aimed at attaining this specific objective of an independent non-communist South Vietnam.

VII

            The U.S. was vitally concerned about the Indochinese region since 1940. The U.S. foreign policy towards Indochina during Second World War was characterized by “ambivalence”. Of the three Indochinese states of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, Vietnam was considered as the most important by the U.S. By 1945 the Vietminh became the dominant political force in Vietnam. On September 2, 1945 Ho Chi Minh proclaimed independence of Vietnam from the French rule. As the U.S. needed a strong French ally in Europe and in the Far East, it did not oppose the restoration of ‘French sovereignty’ in Indochina. The return of the French created an explosive situation in Vietnam. Thus, by the end of 1946, the French and the Vietminh were engaged in an all-out war. The U.S. regarded the war as a matter for French resolution. On February 2, 1950 the French announced the formal ratification of the independence of the Vietnamese. Thus, when the Republic was formally established the U.S. granted diplomatic recognition the Bao Dai government and started providing assistance to the French and the Bao Dai government. Hence by 1952 the U.S. bore 40 percent of the cost of the French – Vietminh war. Moreover, the Eisenhower Administration gave firm assurance of continued assistance to the French. But on May 7, 1954 the French forces were defeated by the Vietminh communist forces in Dien Bien Phu. Subsequently Vietnam was provisionally partitioned along the 17^th parallel, into North Vietnam and South Vietnam. In June, 1954 the Eisenhower Administration sent a team to Vietnam to conduct covert operations in Vietnam. In the aftermath of the Geneva conference, the major U.S. objective in Vietnam was to set up a stable South Vietnamese government. In October, 1954 President Eisenhower offered direct American aid to the Diem government. During 1955-56 periods Diem refused to cooperate in arranging and holding the general elections called for in the Geneva accords. The U.S. accepted Diem’s refusal. The U.S. objective was reunification of Vietnam under an anti-communist leadership. Hence by 1956, the Eisenhower Administration began the process of nation building in South Vietnam. By 1957 insurgency against the Diem government began in South Vietnam. Diem’s counter measures increased popular antagonism towards his government. The official American position was that North Vietnam manipulated the entire war. Hence the U.S. began sending military advisors to South Vietnam in order to train the South Vietnamese in counterinsurgency warfare techniques. In response to the Chinese and Soviet support for the “Wars of National Liberation”, the Kennedy Administration became preoccupied with counterinsurgency. Thus the U.S. conducted covert operations against the Hanoi regime, increased American aid and advisors to South Vietnam and thus boosted the morale of South Vietnamese army. It also authorized the use of defoliants and herbicides in South Vietnam. Meanwhile Diem’s authoritarian policies had alienated the people from his government. Hence Kennedy Administration concluded that the war against the Vietminh communist forces could not be won under the aegis of the Diem government. Hence the U.S. supported a coup by the South Vietnamese Generals which led to the assassination of Diem heightened its responsibilities and deepened its commitments towards South Vietnam. By the end of 1963, according to the U.S. assessment, the situation in South Vietnam was extremely disturbing. Gradually the U.S. increased its aid to South Vietnam. It also increased covert operations against North Vietnam. NSAM 288 of 1964 set the U.S. objective as an independent, non-communist South Vietnam. On August 4, 1964 in connection with the Tonkin Gulf incidents, the U.S. conducted its first direct attack on North Vietnam. On August 5, 1964 the Congress overwhelmingly, supported President Johnson’s policies by passing the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. By September, 1964 John Administration reached a general consensus that air attack against North Vietnam would be necessary to prevent a communist victory in South Vietnam. Gradually the U.S. began escalating military pressure against North Vietnam through sustained bombing for forcing the North to halt its support for insurgency in the South. The first U.S. combat troops entered South Vietnam in March, 1965. Gradually it became clear that bombing of North Vietnam alone would not prevent the collapse of South Vietnam. Thus the U.S. troops assumed the responsibility to defend certain critical areas in South Vietnam and to convince the Viet Cong that they could not win in South Vietnam. But the strategy tacitly yielded initiative to the Viet Cong. Hence in June, 1965 General Westmoreland was given the authority to commit U.S. forces anywhere in South Vietnam. The U.S. goal began to be defeating Viet Cong rather than denying them victory. This left the U.S. with an open-ended military commitment. The American troop level kept mounting. The U.S. escalated pressure on North Vietnam through regular saturation bombing. The political objective was to bring the Viet Cong to the conference table. Gradually the costs of the war increased and anti-war movement grew at home. The Tet offensive of January 30-31, 1968 caused a reevaluation of the U.S. objectives in Vietnam. The Johnson Administration had to devise a new direction in its Vietnam policy. Hence President Johnson asked C.M. Clifford to undertake a complete assessment of the U.S. commitment in Vietnam. The Clifford study suggested the Vietnamization of the war. Thus, gradually the U.S. policy became oriented towards Vietnamization, de-escalation and a negotiated settlement of the conflict. On March 31, 1968 President Johnson announced that he would not substantially add to the number of U.S. troops already in south and declared the halting of air and naval bombardment of North Vietnam. Thus, formal peace talks opened in Paris on May 13, 1968. When the peace talks deadlocked John Administration stepped up its military pressure against North Vietnam. Peace talks resumed on January 25, 1969. With the advent of Nixon Administration Vietnamization and phased withdrawal of American forces became major aspects of American policy in Vietnam. But the American objective persisted to be an independent, non-communist South Vietnam. The U.S. aimed at convincing Hanoi and Viet Cong that a conventional military victory over South Vietnam was outside the realm of possibility. Through the use of U.S. air force, massive buildup of South Vietnam’s military strength and application of military pressure against North Vietnam, the U.S. attempted to force Hanoi to a negotiated settlement of the war. On April 30, 1970 Nixon sent U.S. combat troops into Cambodia for destroying the communist bases and supplies in order to stop communist infiltration into South Vietnam. On May 2, 1970 the bombing of North Vietnam was temporarily resumed. In February, 1971 Nixon again expanded the war by approving a major ground operation into Laos. In response to a massive North Vietnamese offensive across the Demilitarized zone, on April 6, 1972 Nixon ordered the resumption of full-scale bombing of North Vietnam and imposed a naval blockade on North Vietnam by mining the major ports of North Vietnam. Existing stock piles of supplies in North Vietnam were destroyed and supply lines were interdicted. In the meanwhile, Nixon visited Peiking and Moscow. On August 1, 1972 peace talks resumed in Paris, but the negotiations deadlocked again. The U.S. resumed bombing North Vietnam on December 18, 1972. The bombing lasted for eleven days. It was the heaviest American bombing of the entire Vietnam War. Thus, peace talks resumed on January 8, 1973 and a peace agreement was finally signed on January 27, 1973 by the representatives of U.S., North Vietnam, South Vietnam and National Liberation Front of South Vietnam. The Nixon Administration reiterated the American commitment to provide continued American aid to South Vietnam. But after the agreement North Vietnam started infiltrating its troops in to South Vietnam. On June 30, 1973 Congress voted for immediate cessation of all military activity and cut off funds for all military activities in and over Indochina effective from August 15, 1973. The enactment of the War Powers Resolution of November 7, 1973 which formalized Congressional oversight over the President’s use of American troops abroad prevented Nixon from taking any further action in Vietnam. When American aid was cut back, the political and economic problem of South Vietnam sharply aggravated. South Vietnamese provinces began to fall to the North Vietnamese communist forces one after another. On April 21, 1975 the last South Vietnamese defense line before Saigon was captured by the communists. On April 23, 1975 U.S. President Gerald R. Ford proclaimed that the Vietnam War was finished as far as the U.S. was concerned. On April 30, 1975 President Duong Van Minh of South Vietnam announced the unconditional surrender of the government of Republic of Vietnam. Thus, Vietnam was reunified under a communist government.

VIII

            In analyzing the American foreign policy in Vietnam, the basic nature or the identity of the actor was dealt with by examining the historical consciousness of the U.S. The Americans believed in wealth and prestige as desirable goals. Though they believed in the ethical or fundamental equality of all, they had contempt for the theory of permanent equality of property. They believed that the state should protect the property rights of the individuals and that it should promote economic opportunities and free enterprise. Christian religion had great influence on the beliefs of Americans. Most of them believed that God was the absolute sovereign ruler of all creations. They considered America as a redeemer nation. What the Americans had in common was only the American creed which included the political ideas of equality, liberty, individualism, constitutionalism and democracy. The American creed constituted the very basis of American national identity. The fundamental purpose of the U.S. was to assure the integrity and vitality of its free society founded upon the dignity and worth of the individual. By the end of the Second World War, the Americans had concluded that preventing aggression anywhere in the world was essential for its own national security. Such beliefs and values constituted the very core of the historical consciousness of the U.S. by the year 1950. On the basis of this historical consciousness the Americans perceived the expansionist tendencies of the international communism under the leadership of Kremlin as a grave threat to its national security because the creed and practices of international communism were irreconcilable with the principles of the U.S. faith. According to the U.S. the basic tenet of the Soviet Communist thought system was the original communist thesis of the innate antagonism between capitalism and socialism. According to the U.S. perception the Soviet leaders believed in the basic badness of capitalism, in the inevitability of its destruction and the obligation of the proletariat to assist the destruction. The Soviet leaders also believed that permanent peaceful coexistence of communist and capitalist nations was impossible. They also believed that the integrity and vitality of U.S. society had to be destroyed, if they had to attain their objective of world domination. With the victory of communists in China and outbreak of Korean War, the communist everywhere began to be considered as equally dangerous. Thus, the defense of Southeast Asia from communist domination, prevention of the communist victory in Indochina and the maintenance of an independent, non-communist South Vietnam were considered as essential for the American security interests. On the basis of its image of a grave threat from the international communism, the U.S. oriented its actions towards protecting its basic interest of national security and welfare of the people. Thus the U.S. initiated the policy of containing the Soviet communist system and the development of a healthy international community. As the prospect of a defeat was the only sure means of deterring Soviet “aggression”, the U.S. was prepared to wage atomic and biological warfare it necessary. With the victory of communists in China and the outbreak of Korean War, the containment policy was directed against all communist everywhere. The U.S. decided to prevent any further gains for communism in Asia. Hence the U.S. actions were gradually oriented towards a military victory over the Vietminh communist forces in Indochina in order to prevent the communist domination of Southeast Asia. Thus the U.S. favored a military victory over the Vietminh in Vietnam. The primary objective of the U.S. in Vietnam was an independent, non-communist South Vietnam. The U.S. foreign policy actions in Vietnam were aimed at attaining this specific objective.

IX

            Thus, in analyzing the American Foreign Policy in Vietnam War 1950 – 1975, it was essential to take into account the historical consciousness of the U.S., its perceptions of the post war world situation and how it oriented its actions towards its perceived ‘image’ of the situation. Such a study was made possible by applying the Ideology Framework to the case of American foreign policy in Vietnam War 1950 – 1975 by identifying the various aspects of the action process in the case. Thus, the case of American Foreign Policy in Vietnam War, 1950 – 1975 was studied by identifying the historical consciousness of the U.S., its perception of the post war international situation, its action orientation towards it perceived “image” of the world situation and also its foreign policy actions in Vietnam War during 1950-1975. Such a study would not have been possible if the analysis was restricted to a mere description of the American foreign policy in Vietnam war 1950-1975. But by dealing also with the historical consciousness of the U.S., its perceptions of the post war world situation and its action orientation towards its perceived image of the world situation, the study was placed in its proper perspective and was made more comprehensive and meaningful. Thus, the Ideology Framework is useful for analyzing foreign policies of states.

            Thus, in short, the present study both identified the need for a framework for foreign policy analysis which would provide due importance to the decision makers’ perceptions and formulated such a framework for foreign policy analysis with the help of the concept of ideology. The viability of the framework for foreign policy analysis was then substantiated by applying the framework for analyzing the American Foreign Policy in Vietnam War 1950-1975.