By January 16, 1969 an agreement was reached that both sides would sit around a circular table with no flags or markings or identification. The U.S. and South Vietnam would regard the communist side as a single delegation headed by Hanoi and the communists would regard the allied side as a single delegation headed by the U.S.  But officially Hanoi would insist that the NLF was a separate and independent delegation, and the U.S. would equally be insistent on proclaiming the independence of the Saigon delegation (G.C. Herring. Op. cit. PP. 217-219).

When peace talks began on January 25, 1969 the Nixon Administration had taken over. The advent of Nixon Administration significantly changed the face of the war. Vietnamization and the phased withdrawal of American forces became the major aspects of the American policy in Vietnam. Effort was to turn the war back to the Vietnamese. Vietnamization was an essential ingredient of the policy of lightening the American combat burden in the war. By gradually withdrawing the American troops, the war was made tolerable for the American people. The American objective persisted to be an independent non-communist South Vietnam. The objective had to be attained through an honorable peace settlement. For this the U.S. remained in South Vietnam to convince Hanoi and Viet Cong that a conventional military victory over South Vietnam was outside the realm of possibility. Ending the war honorably was considered as essential for the peace of the world because defeat of U.S. arms would undermine the prestige of the U.S. in international affairs. Hence through the use of U.S. air force, massive build-up of South Vietnam’s military strength and the application of military pressure against North Vietnam, the U.S. attempted to provide Hanoi an incentive to negotiate an end to the war (See Richard M. Nixon. R. N.: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon. New York: Grosset and Dunlap. 1978. PP. 349 -350). The peace talk which began on January 25, 1969 did not produce any substantive results. Hence late in February, 1969 the Viet Cong launched a second Tet offensive. But it was turned back by the U.S. and South Vietnamese forces.

Gradually the Nixon Administration initiated the phased withdrawal of American troops. On June 8, 1969 Nixon, after conferring with President Thieu at Midway Island announced an immediate withdrawal of 25,000 American troops from South Vietnam by August 31. It was also announced that the South Vietnamese army would assume more of the burden of the nation’s defense and that the U.S. troops would be withdrawn from the ground combat as the effectiveness of the South Vietnamese army improved. Under the Vietnamization program, U.S. would continue to provide South Vietnam with air support and would train and equip the South Vietnamese forces to the point that they would be able to contain the communists with minimum American tactical support. The program of enlarging and upgrading the RVNAF continued for the next three years.

As the withdrawals continued, Nixon delivered several tough speeches stressing the Administration’s intention to uphold America’s international responsibilities. But his diplomacy and military threats failed to wrench any concession from Hanoi. Hanoi continued to insist on the total and unconditional withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Vietnam and called for the establishment of a provisional coalition government from which Thieu would be excluded. Gradually anti-war momentum began spreading (For details see D. Benedetti: An American Ordeal: The Anti-War Movement of the Vietnam Era. New York: Syracuse University Press, 1990). Hence Nixon had to rally the public behind him. In his speech on November 3, 1969 Nixon emphasized that he would strengthen the South Vietnamese to defend them, as American forces were gradually withdrawn. He said that the Vietnamization would not only reduce American causalities but also would terminate the American involvement in an honorable fashion. He was ready to compromise with communists on the condition that they recognize the Saigon government. But he warned that he would take “strong and effective measures” if they intensified their military actions. As all these required more time, he pleaded for public backing. He dismissed protestors as irresponsible elements and appealed for the support of the “great silent majority” (For details see PPP. Richard M. Nixon. 1969. Washington: U.S. G.P.O., PP. 901 -909).

Gradual withdrawals went on. For years the U.S. military had been anxious to attack the North Vietnamese sanctuaries in Cambodia. Immediately after Nixon’s inauguration General Wheeler and General Abrams had proposed U.S. action against the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong presence in Cambodia. In March 1970 Cambodia’s neutralist Prince Norodom Sihanouk was overthrown by a pro-American clique headed by Prime Minister Lon Nol. The U.S. quickly recognized the new government and began covert military aid. By April 1970 a large buildup of North Vietnamese; Viet Cong and Cambodian communist forces had been detected in areas adjacent to South Vietnam. The U.S. military experts perceived the possibility of a major offensive into South Vietnam from supply bases in Cambodia. The change of government in Cambodia provided a favorable situation for an attack on the communist forces. On April 30, 1970 Nixon justified the Cambodian incursion saying that “if the world’s most powerful nation acts like a pitiful, helpless giant, the forces of totalitarianism and anarchy will threaten free nations and free institutions throughout the world” (PPP. Richard M. Nixon. 1970. Washington: U.S. G.P.O. PP.405).

On May 2, 1970 the bombing on North Vietnam was temporarily resumed. This reignited domestic dissension and erupted war protests in the U.S. suddenly. On July 1, 1970 the American forces were withdrawn from Cambodia. The attack on Cambodia by the combined forces of the U.S. and South Vietnam destroyed large amounts of rice supplies, arsenal and the traditional communist sanctuaries. This rendered the Viet Cong unable to mount effective offensive on South Vietnam during 1970 and 1971. This bought time for Vietnamization. During this period the U.S. provided huge quantities of newest weapons to South Vietnam and thus South Vietnamese army became one of the largest and best equipped in the world.  

By the end of 1970, according to the U.S. intelligence reports, the infiltration of men and supplies to Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam increased. At that time the U.S. had only 1,75,000 men in Vietnam of whom only 75,000 were combat forces. Nixon decided to step up the military pressure against North Vietnam. The U.S. aircrafts mounted heavy attacks against supply lines, bridges, base camps and trails across the demilitarized zone and in Hanoi and Haiphong area in North Vietnam. In February 1971 Nixon again expanded the war by approving a major ground operation into Laos. ARVN assumed the burden of fighting with American air support. The objective of the war effort was to buy time for Vietnamization by disrupting ‘enemy’ supply lines. But at home the anti-war demonstrations became more unruly and resulted in serious riots (for details on anti-war movement see N. Zaroulis and G. Sullivan. Who Spoke Up? American Protest against the War in Vietnam, 1963-1975. New York: Doubleday, 1984).

In May 1971 Nixon offered the withdrawal of American troops from South Vietnam in exchange for the release of American prisoners of war and termination of further North Vietnamese infiltration. The discussions eventually broke down over the issue of Thieu regime. On January 25, 1972 the U.S. and South Vietnam presented Hanoi with an eight-point peace plan. The U.S. military forces would be withdrawn within six months of signing the peace agreement and the withdrawal of U.S. forces would be accompanied by the release of all military and civilian prisoners of war. Free and democratic elections would be held in South Vietnam and provisions of Geneva agreements of 1954 and 1962 would be formally affirmed by all parties. A general cease-fire would take effect immediately after signing the peace agreement with international supervision of the cease fire. Finally, all parties would pledge themselves to respect the territorial integrity of Indochinese states and the national rights of Indochinese peoples would be protected by international guarantees. But Hanoi was not satisfied.

By the end of 1971 summit meetings had been scheduled for both Peking and Moscow. Nixon hoped that it would leave North Vietnam isolated with no choice but to come to terms. On February 21, 1972 Nixon arrived in China. The visit caused the North Vietnamese worry about their communist friends. On March 30, 1972 North Vietnam launched a massive offensive across the demilitarized zone. At the time there were only 6000 American combat troops and their activities were limited and the RVNAF had completely taken over the combat on the ground. On April 6, 1972 Nixon ordered the resumption of full-scale bombing of North Vietnam. Thus, LINE BACKER I began. There was a tremendous volume of U.S. air activity. On May 8, 1972 in a national address Nixon said that he had “concluded that Hanoi must be denied the weapons and supplies it needs to continue the aggression… All entrances to the North Vietnamese ports will be mined to prevent access to these ports and North Vietnamese naval operations from these ports. United States Forces have been directed … to interdict the delivery of any supplies. Rail and other communications will be cut off to the maximum extent possible. Air and naval strikes against military targets in North Vietnam will continue” (PPP. Richard M. Nixon. 1972. Washington: D.C. U.S. G.P.O, 1974. PP. 585)

Thus, on May 8, 1972 Nixon took the unprecedented step of mining the port of Haiphong and other major ports of North Vietnam. This resulted in a naval blockade of North Vietnam halting the arrival of military supplies and armaments for Hanoi from external sources. The highways and railroads from china were interdicted. The flow of supplies from North to South was reduced through a stepped-up interdiction campaign on the lines of communication to the South. The existing stockpiles of supplies already in North Vietnam were destroyed by sustained bombing campaign.

On May 20 Nixon arrived in Moscow for the summit meeting with Brezhnev. Though China and Soviet Union protested against the extension of the war, they urged Hanoi to make peace with the U.S.  Most of the Americans back home; the domestic reaction to the war also was nominal and manageable. Thus, Hanoi realized that a military victory was not possible in South Vietnam.

On August 1, 1972 peace talks resumed in Paris. On October 26, 1972 an agreement on a peace settlement was announced. According to the terms of the agreement there would be a cease-fire in Vietnam and within sixty days after the commencement of the cease-fire all U.S. troops would be withdrawn from Vietnam and all military and civilian prisoners of war would be released. A National Council of National Reconciliation and Control would be established to plan general elections in South Vietnam to be conducted under the international supervision which would result in a national government representative of all South Vietnamese political factions. The eventual reunification of North Vietnam and South Vietnam could then be accomplished by peaceful political means. But President Thieu rejected the agreements due to the tripartite nature of the National Council and the continued presence of North Vietnamese troops in South Vietnam. In an effort to find a solution to the objections of Saigon, Kissinger met Tho and reopened the discussion from November 20 to 25, and from December 4 to 13. But North Vietnam refused to make any substantive changes in the October 26 agreement. On December 13 Tho suspended the deadlock negotiations and returned to Hanoi. 

In order to force Hanoi to agree to the U.S. modification of the peace agreement, Nixon resumed bombing on North Vietnam on December 18, 1972. Thus, LINE BACKER II began. It was the heaviest American bombing of the entire Vietnam War. It lasted for 11 days (For details see. M. Clodfelter. The Limits of Air Power: The American Bombing of North Vietnam. New York: The Free Press, 1989. PP. 177 – 202). It was indented to inflict maximum damage on North Vietnam and thus making it incapable of threatening South Vietnam after a peace settlement had been concluded. Nixon explained the reasons for the bombing: “… on December 18, 1972 when our hopes for peace were so high and when the North Vietnamese stone walled us at the conference table – I found it necessary to order more air strikes on military targets in North Vietnam to break the deadlock”(Quoted in W.S. Thompson and D.D.Frizzell.(eds). Op.cit. p. 168).

As almost all the American troops were back home, the public response to the bombing was relatively limited. But Nixon’s popular approval rating plummeted to 39 percent. Nixon’s critics denounced him as “mad man”. The bombing evoked outrage across the world. Soviet Union and China responded angrily. On December 30, 1972 U.S. halted the bombing after Hanoi agreed to resume the Paris talks on January 8, 1973. Thus, Kissinger and Tho resumed their discussion on January 8, 1973 and resolved their differences on the next day. The peace agreement was finally signed on January 27, 1973 by the representatives of U.S., North Vietnam, South Vietnam and National Liberation Front of South Vietnam (See G.C. Herring. Op.cit. PP.235 – 259; G. Lewy. Op.cit. PP. 410 – 415. For description of the immediate background and situation of the Paris Agreement see A.R. Isaacs. Without Honor: Defeat in Vietnam and Cambodia. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983. PP.16-70).

According to the agreement a cease-fire would be observed on June 27, 1973 and the U.S. would stop all its military activities against North Vietnam. The U.S. would remove or destroy all the mines in the territorial waters, ports, harbors and water ways of North Vietnam as soon as the agreement goes into effect. Within sixty days of signing the agreement the U.S. would withdraw all its troops, military personnel and war material from South Vietnam and dismantle all U.S. military bases in South Vietnam. The U.S. ensured to respect the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Vietnam as was recognized by the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Vietnam. The military demarcation line between the two zones at the 17^th parallel was accepted not as a political or territorial boundary but only as provisional as was understood in the 1954 Geneva conference. The reunification of Vietnam would be carried out through peaceful means by discussion and agreements between North Vietnam and South Vietnam’s chances for survival were crucially affected by two key provisions such as the implicit legitimation of the North Vietnamese armed forces in the South and the unanimity principle adopted for the new International Commission on Control and Supervision which virtually guaranteed that the supervision of adherence to the accords would be ineffective (For details see Appendix V).

Hence before the signing of the agreement the government of South Vietnam had expressed its unwillingness to accept the terms of the settlement but President Nixon in a letter to Thieu on January 5, 1973 warned that “the gravest consequences would then ensue if your government chose to reject the agreement and split off from the United States” (American Foreign Relations: A Documentary Record. Washington: U.S.G.P.O., 1973. PP. 19 – 20). On the other hand, Nixon said: “should you decide … to go with us, you have my assurance of continued assistance in the post-settlement period and that we will respond with full force should the settlement be violated by North Vietnam” (Ibid. P.20).

On January 23, 1973 in a Radio – Television address also Nixon reiterated the American commitment to provide continued American aid to South Vietnam (Ibid. P.21). But immediately after the signing of the agreements, North Vietnam started infiltrating its troops into South Vietnam through Lagos and Cambodia. Nixon warned North Vietnam and resumed American reconnaissance flights over North Vietnam. Moreover, a formidable naval and air power was kept in the Gulf of Tonkin. On March 29, 1973 the final installment of the American troops left South Vietnam and on April 1 the last American prisoners were released in Hanoi. Nixon hailed the completion of American withdrawal from Vietnam. Though there were reports of continuing North Vietnamese build up in the following months Nixon did not respond. The possibility of sending the bombers back disappeared when on June 30, 1973 Congress voted for immediate cessation of all military activity and cut off funds for all military activity on and over Indochina effective from August 15, 1973. The enactment of the War Powers Resolution on November 7, 1973 which formalized the Congressional oversight over President’s use of American troops abroad prevented Nixon from taking any further action in Vietnam. Thus the U.S. ability to deter a new North Vietnamese attack on the South with the threat of reemploying U.S. military power was eliminated (See Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report. Congressional Quarterly Inc., Washington D.C. XXXI. 1973. p.1854; G. Lewy. Op. cit. P.204; G.C. Herring. Op. cit. p.261).

Gradually, by early 1974 South Vietnam’s economic and political problems sharply aggravated. In the fiscal year 1973 America had provided 2.270 billion dollars for the support of the RVNAF. But in 1974 the American aid was only 1.010 billion dollars. In 1974 the South Vietnamese losses in the battle were higher than ever. The available funds were insufficient. The resulted shortage of war material and ammunition had a damaging impact on the South Vietnamese morale. The cut backs in military supplies at the time of mounting North Vietnamese and Viet Cong pressure generated a psychology of accommodation, retreat and despair among the South Vietnamese armed forces. The effect on military morale of the economic hardships experienced by the South Vietnamese people appeared to be as serious as the shortages in supplies. To make up for the loss of American assistance the GVN resorted to raising taxes and printing more money. The result was high rate of inflation and vast human suffering. The RVNAF desertions increased (G. Lewy. Op. cit. P. 215-217).

On August 9, 1974 Nixon resigned. In September 1974 the Congress approved an aid program of 700 million dollars to South Vietnam for the fiscal year 1975. The American air cut backs resulted in shortages of gasoline, spare parts and ammunitions. The economic crisis of South Vietnam and the weakened posture of RVNAF presented an opportunity for North Vietnam to take over South Vietnam. Moreover, America was declined for any further involvement in Vietnam. On January 6, 1975 NVA forces captured Phuoc Long Province of South Vietnam. The failure of the U.S. to react to the seizure provided Hanoi the empirical confirmation that America would no longer intervene in Vietnam. Hence the North Vietnamese forces opened a concerted attack in the central high lands. On March 11 the communist captured Ban McThuot. On the same day the U.S. House of Representatives rejected the 300 million dollars supplementary military appropriation bill which President Ford had attempted to push through Congress. Now it was amply clear that South Vietnam could expect no further aid from the U.S.  On March 18 Pleiku and Kontum were in North Vietnamese hands. On March 25 Hue fell. On March 30 Da Nang fell. In early April President Ford asked Congress for 722 million dollars in emergency military aid to South Vietnam. But the Congress men argued that no amount of money would save the South Vietnamese army (For details see P.E. Haley. Congress and the Fall of South Vietnam and Cambodia. Rutherford. N.J.: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1982). But eventually the congress approved 300 million dollars for evacuating Americans from South Vietnam. On April 21, 1975 the last South Vietnamese defense line before Saigon was captured by the communists. On the same day President Thieu resigned. On April 23, 1975 President Ford proclaimed that the Vietnam War was finished as far as the U.S. was concerned. As a result of Thieu’s resignation, General Duong Van Minh was sworn in as President of South Vietnam on April 28. on April 30, 1975 the North Vietnamese tanks entered Saigon and President Minh announced the unconditional surrender of the government of the Republic of Vietnam. The withdrawal of U.S. troops, the loss of U.S. air power, declines aid and the concomitant psychological effects of no longer being regarded by the U.S. as worth saving all had considerable impact on the fall of South Vietnam. The refusal of the U.S. to intervene in the final crisis marked the downfall of South Vietnam (See S.T. Hosmer. Et al. The Fall of South Vietnam: Statements by Vietnamese Military and Civilian Leaders. New York: Crane Russak and Company Inc., 1980. PP. 9-10; for details on the downfall of the South Vietnam see A. Dawson. 55 Days: The Fall of South Vietnam. Eaglewood Cliffs. N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1977; T. Terzani. BilaiPhong! The Fall and Liberation of South Vietnam. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1976; Butler: The Fall of Saigon: Scenes from the Sudden End of a Long War. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1985).

America in Vietnam War During Nixon Administration – 2

On August 5, 1964 President Johnson asked Congress for a Joint Resolution of support for his Vietnam policies. The Congress the passed the Resolution of August 7, 1964 by a vote of 88 to 2 in the Senate and 416 to 0 in the House of Representatives, thus it was “Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, that the Congress approve and supports the determination of the President as Commander in Chief to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression.

The United States regards as vital to its national interests and to world peace, the maintenance of international peace and security in Southeast Asia. Consonant with the Constitution of the United States and the Charter of the United Nations and in accordance with its obligations under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the United States is therefore prepared as the President determines to take all necessary steps including the use of armed force to assist any member of protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, requesting assistance in defense of its freedom” (DSB Vol. LI.No.1313. August 24, 1964. P. 268. See also Appendix IV. For details see. J. Galloway. The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. Rutherford, N.J.: Fairleigh, Dickenson University Press, 1970).

The Tonkin Gulf incidents, the swift reprisals and the nearly unanimous Congressional support demonstrated the U.S. commitment to South Vietnam. The U.S. prestige was now publicly and more firmly committed not merely to defending South Vietnam but also to responding North Vietnamese provocations. It gave President relative freedom of action, and public support was assured.

The Johnson Administration shared the fundamental assumption that an independent, non-communist South Vietnam was vital to the defense of Southeast Asia and for America’s global credibility. From 1954 onwards, the U.S. strategy was mainly that of bolstering the South Vietnamese by sending advisers and providing logistical and economic support in the hope that this could stop and reverse the subversive efforts of the communists within South Vietnam. But by September 1964 the Administration was aware of the likelihood of the continued deterioration of the political situation in South Vietnam for the foreseeable future. When Johnson realized that South Vietnam was unable to prevent what appeared to be an inevitable communist victory, he decided to Americanize the war for denying victory to the communists. On September 7, 1964 Johnson Administration reached a general consensus that air attack against North Vietnam would have to be launched. Thus, during August – October period the Administration had accepted the view that overt military pressures against North Vietnam would be required (See PP. Gravel ed. Vol. III. PP. 206 – 207)

On November 1, 1964 the Viet Cong attacked the U.S. air base at Bien Hoa. There was no immediate reaction from President Johnson. But on November 3, when the polls had confirmed his victory in the elections, Johnson created an Inter-Agency Working Group to study the U.S. options in Southeast Asia. The recommendations of the group presented to the President included two phases. Phase one included the intensification of air strikes against infiltration routes in Laos and covert actions in North Vietnamese targets in response to attack on U.S. forces in the South and increased efforts to reform and strengthens the South Vietnamese government. The phase two called for a sustained escalating campaign of air strikes against North Vietnam to dissuade it from further support of the war in the South. President Johnson fully approved phase one. But approved phase two only in principle (PP. Graveled. Vol. III. p. 5).

On Christmas Eve there was a Viet Cong attack on Brinks Hotel in Saigon where American officials were housed. But President Johnson did not retaliate. Again, on December 26, when the Viet Cong virtually destroyed two South Vietnamese battalions in a battle at BinhGia, there was another visible set back. Thus, by January 1965, the Administration was beset by frustration and anguish over the threat of an imminent collapse of the government of South Vietnam. Gradually President Johnson came to the conclusion that the persisting instability in the South required the U.S. to bomb the North. Soon President Johnson approved retaliatory bombings of North Vietnam “immediately following the occurrence of a spectacular enemy action” (See K. Stanley. Op. cit. PP. 410 – 411). Thus, the stage was set for a new strategy: a strategy of gradually escalating pressure against North Vietnam in the hope of convincing the North to halt its support for the insurgency in the South. This strategy was essentially based on bombing (W.S. Thompson and D.D. Frizzell (eds). The Lessons of Vietnam. St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1977. P.58. For details of the U.S. propaganda and psychological operations in Vietnam during 1965–1972 periods see R.W. Chandler. War of Ideas: The U.S. Propaganda Campaign in Vietnam. Boulder: Westview Press, 1981. PP. 39 – 248).

On February 7, 1965 the Viet Cong conducted raids upon the U.S. advisers’ barracks and on American helicopter base near Pleiku in South Vietnam. The attack marked a turning point in the Vietnam War. On February 8, 1965 Johnson ordered reprisal attacks against North Vietnam, code named FLAMMING DART I. American aircrafts attacked North Vietnamese military installations across the 17^th parallel. This U.S. action transformed the nature of the war and the U.S. role in it. It also became the opening move for the sustained U.S. bombing against North Vietnam. On February 10, 1965 the Viet Cong staged another raid against U.S. enlisted men’s barracks in Qui Nhon in South Vietnam. Within 24 hours U.S. and South Vietnamese aircrafts executed heavier retaliatory strikes against North Vietnam code named FLAMING DART II. On February 13, 1965 President Johnson decided to begin operation ROLLING THUNDER the sustained bombing of North Vietnam. The first ROLLING THUNDER began on March 2, 1965. By March 15, 1965 the ROLLING THUNDER program against the North was transformed from a sporadic halting effort into a regular, continuing and military significant effort. The U.S. reprisal air strikes against North Vietnam and its transformation in to ROLLING THUNDER were made against the background of the American concern over the threat of an imminent collapse of the GVN and its military effort against Viet Cong. The Johnson Administration had perceived that only a major American military effort could stave off a communist victory. The ROLLING THUNDER operations were launched in the hope that it would strengthen the GVN confidence and cohesion and that it would deter or restrain the DRV from continuing its support for the revolutionary war in the South. It was designed to force Hanoi to a negotiated settlement of the war. There was also the hope that a quite modest bombing effort would be sufficient and that the demonstration of the American determination and the potential risks and costs to the North implicit in the early air strikes would provide the U.S. with substantial bargaining leverage (PP. DOD ed. BK. 4. PP. 69 – 73; G. Lewy. Op.cit. PP. 375 – 406).

One week after the beginning of the ROLLING THUNDER, U.N. Secretary General U. Thant urged Johnson to negotiate and end the war. But Johnson was willing for discussion only on the precondition that North Vietnam first recognize South Vietnam as a permanent nation state and that Viet Cong cease all its acts of ‘aggression’. Moreover, he refused to negotiate with NLF claiming that it was a puppet of Hanoi. But the position of DRV was that the U.S. halt bombing of North Vietnam talk directly with NLF and withdraw its military personnel from South Vietnam prior to peace discussion. Due to the irreconcilability of their positions both sides tended to resort to arms in order to attain their aims.

ROLLING THUNDER failed to attain its objectives. Once set in motion the bombing effort stiffened Hanoi’s determination. As Hanoi remained intractable the U.S. shifted to more intensify military pressures. The American air field at Da Nang was vulnerable to Viet Cong attack. Hence General Westmoreland urgently requested two marine battalions for protecting the air base. On March 8, 1965 two U.S. Marine Corps battalions were landed at Da Nang in South Vietnam. Thus, the first U.S. combat troops entered South Vietnam. It represented a crucial event in the history of U.S. involvement in Vietnam. It also gave rise to the new strategy of base security. It was an adjunct of the decision to bomb North Vietnam. The mission of the marine was “to occupy and defend critical terrain features in order to secure the air field and as directed communication facilities, U.S. supporting installations, port facilities, landing beaches and other U.S. installations against attack. The U.S. marine forces, repeat, will not engage in day to day actions against the Viet Cong” (PP. Gravel ed. Vol. III. P. 417). But the strategy of base security expired along with the early hopes that ROLLING THUNDER would succeed by itself.

America in Vietnam War During Nixon Administration – 3

On March 30, 1965 there was a Viet Cong attack on U.S. embassy in Saigon. By the time it became clear that ROLLING THUNDER had failed to produce the expected results. Johnson Administration felt that it should convince the Viet Cong that it could not win in the South. Gradually the war in the South began to assume priority. Thus, convinced that the bombing of North Vietnam alone would not prevent the collapse of South Vietnam, on April 1, 1965 Johnson decided to use American ground troops for offensive action in South Vietnam. The decision as embodied in the NSAM 328 of April 6, was that the “President approved a change of mission for all marine battalions deployed to Vietnam to permit their more active use under conditions to the established and approved by the Secretary of State” (PP.DOD ed. BK. 4. PP.68 – 69; also see Ibid. PP. 124 – 126).

Thus, the enclave strategy came into existence. Accordingly, the American troops assumed the responsibility to defend five major areas of South Vietnam. But most of the fighting was still left to the South Vietnamese. The enclave strategy proposed that the U.S. troops, occupying the coastal enclaves could go to the rescue of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) within 50 miles of their base area. The objective of the strategy was to deny certain critical areas to the Viet Cong. During May 1965 the South Vietnamese were defeated in a series of battles at Ba Gia. In early June 1965 two Viet Cong regiments again defeated the South Vietnamese at Dong Xaoi inflicting heavy causalities. Although the U.S. troops were nearby in both the cases, they could not prevent the South Vietnamese defeats. By mid-June, 1965 the Viet Cong offensive was in full stride. In order to cope with the situation Westmoreland requested deployment of American forces in order to obtain a substantial offensive capability to convince the Viet Cong that they could not win. Hence on 26 June, 1965 Westmoreland was given the authority to commit U.S. forces anywhere in South Vietnam when in his judgment they were needed to strengthen the relative position of the RNVNAF. Thus, liberated from the restrictions of the coastal enclaves, the U.S. forces began their first major combat action in Vietnam War on June 27, 1965. Thus, the goal of inflicting defeat on the Viet Cong, rather than denying it victory, left the U.S. with an open-ended military commitment (See PP. Gravel ed. Vol. III. PP. 340.395 – 396, 461; PP.NYT ed. PP.424 – 427).

In July 1965 Westmoreland reported that without massive U.S. intervention in South Vietnam, within six months it would be completely overrun by the communists. This warning led to a review of U.S. policy in Vietnam during July 21 – 27, 1965. After a visit to Vietnam, McNamara declared that the situation in Vietnam had deteriorated greatly. On July 28, President accepted McNamara’s recommendation of building up 1,75,000 men by October 1965. Gradually the U.S. began to inject its military power directly into the struggle in South Vietnam in order to meet the communist challenge there (For detailed description of how the decision to commit U.S. ground forces to defend South Vietnam was arrived at. See W.C. Gibbsons. The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War: Executive and Legislative Roles and Relationships. Part III January – July 1965. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989. For details of United State Military Presence in South Vietnam see Appendix I). The new category emphasized on gradual buildup of forces in the South for putting maximum pressure on the communist structure and forces in the South and also on pacification and nation building. During 1966 – 1967 the American forces fought to seize the initiative through the tactics of ‘search and destroy’ operations in conjunction with rural pacification program. Thus, American forces would fight the Viet Cong and eliminate their base camps and logistic installations. The basic purpose was to take the war to the Viet Cong, denying them freedom of movement anywhere in the country by taking advantage of the superior fire power and maneuverability of U.S. forces in order to give the Viet Cong the heaviest possible blows. When American forces move out, the South Vietnamese army would move into keep the communists from returning to the village. In the meantime, RVNAF could engage in the pacification and nation building activities (See PP Gravel ed. Vol. III. P. 395; W.S. Thompson and D.D. Frizzell. Op. cit. pp. 58, 69).

During 1966 – 1967 the American troop level kept mounting. The U.S. escalated pressure on the North through regular saturation bombing. The sorties against North Vietnam increased from 25,000 in 1965 to 79,000 in 1966 and 108,000 in 1967. The tonnage of bombs dropped increased from 63,000 in 1965 to 13,6000 in 1966 to 22,6000 in 1967. The air strikes were majorly directed at military bases, infiltration routes and supply depots, industrial and transportation system and steel factories and power plants. During 1966-67 the tonnage of bombs dropped on South Vietnam was twice the number of bombs dropped on the North. The herbicides that were used for depriving the Viet Cong natural cover destroyed one-third of South Vietnam’s timber – lands (For details on the air war see R. Littauer and N. Uphoff (eds). The Air War in Indochina. Boston: Beacon Press, 1972. PP. 17 – 75; M. Clodfelter. Op.cit. PP.73 – 115).

The political objective of the effort was to bring the Viet Cong to the conference table. Hence Johnson kept urging the North Vietnam to enter into discussion for an honorable settlement of the war. But the North Vietnamese kept insisting that they would not negotiate as long as they were under bombing raids. Thus, as neither side willing to compromise, the war raged on.

During the Manila Conference held during October 24-25, 1966 the U.S. offered Hanoi a plan of mutual troop withdrawals from South Vietnam. According to the plan as the North Vietnam withdrew its troops from South Vietnam and the level of violence subsided, the U.S. would begin evacuating their forces and would be out of Vietnam within six months. But Hanoi refused to acknowledge that it had troops in South Vietnam and insisted that U.S. talk directly with Viet Cong. In November, 1966 Johnson offered an unconditional halting of the bombing of North provided Hanoi would de-escalate its involvement in South to demonstrate its good will and desire for peace. But while the discussions were going on in Warsaw, the U.S. continued bombing Hanoi. On the night of December 13-14 there was a particularly intense bombing on Hanoi and the angry North Vietnamese broke off the talks. During 1966 Christmas holidays Johnson initiated a bombing pause “to lay foundation in the minds of American public and world opinion for an enlarged phase of the war” (PP. Gravel ed. Vol. IV. P. 33). For carrying out the “peace offensive” Johnson dispatched persons such as Averrel Harriman and Vice President Hubert Humphrey across the world to deliver the message that the U.S. was prepared to negotiate without condition. But the terms of settlement, as revealed by the State Department, offered few concessions and rested firm on the determination to maintain an independent, non-communist South Vietnam.

Accordingly, the U.S. would stop bombing after Hanoi took reciprocal steps of de-escalation and U.S. would withdraw its troops from South Vietnam after a satisfactory political settlement had reached. But North Vietnam refused to perform reciprocal acts in exchange for a cessation of bombing and declared that unconditional halt of U.S. bombing would be a prerequisite for peace discussions. The U.S., unwilling to accept the conditions of Hanoi, resumed a greatly expanded bombing on January 31, 1967.

On February 8, 1967 President Johnson sent a personal letter to Ho Chi Minh. He offered to end the bombing of North and to freeze U.S. troop strength in the South in return for a North Vietnamese commitment to reduce its infiltration of the South. But Ho demanded that U.S. halt its bombing, withdraw its forces from the South and negotiate directly with NLF. In the meantime, while Soviet Minister Harold Wilson asked Johnson to extend the bombing truce to give Kosygin time to persuade Hanoi to stop infiltration of South. But Johnson resumed air attacks on North Vietnam saying that Hanoi used the truce to re supply its forces in the South. Wilson blamed Johnson for missing the opportunity for peace (See G.C. Herring. Op. cit. PP. 168-169).

In May 1967, for the first time in the war U.S. and South Vietnamese forces moved into the demilitarized zone. The U.S. also began bombing major civilian installations in North Vietnam, knocking out the electric power plants in Hanoi and Haiphong. In that summer Viet Cong carried the war to the cities. To meet the new challenge 70,000 more U.S. troops were deployed. But as the cost of the war increased Johnson found himself caught in the midst of an increasingly angry and divisive debate at home. The “hawks” viewed the American efforts in Vietnam as an essential element in the global struggle against communism and demanded that the administration do whatever necessary to attain victory. But the “doves” opposed the war, and antiwar movement grew almost in proportion to the escalation of the American role in Vietnam conflict. The public mood was “tired, angry and frustrated” (See Ibid. PP. 170 – 185). On September 29, 1967 Johnson announced that the U.S. would be willing to halt the bombing on North Vietnam in return for a communist commitment to begin serious peace negotiations. But Hanoi rejected the overture saying that if offered nothing new.

The test offensive of January 30-31, 1968 was one of the turning points in American involvement in Vietnam. On that day Viet Cong staged a massive, coordinated assault on all major cities and military installations in South Vietnam. The event had tremendous impact in the U.S. (For details see M. Maclear The Ten Thousand Day War: Vietnam 1945 – 1975. New York: Martin’s Press, 1981. PP. 202-223. For details on Tet Offensive see D. Lyndon Johnson’s War. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1989. PP. 139-175). It caused a revaluation of the objectives of the U.S. in Vietnam. Though the Viet Cong suffered heavy losses they gained the psychological and political victory. W. Cronkite summed up the American mood “To say that we are closer to victory today is to believe, in the face of the evidence, the optimists who have been wrong in the past. To suggest that we are on the edge of defeat is to yield to unreasonable pessimism. To say that we are mired in stalemate seems the only reasonable yet unsatisfactory conclusion” (Quoted in G.C. Herring. Op. cit. P. 201).

America in Vietnam War During Nixon Administration – 4

The Tet crisis reinforced the feelings of the American people that the war was bogged down and that a military solution would not be found in the near future. By 1968 the cost of the war both in political and economic terms had already reached unacceptable levels. Moreover, there was no assurance that man power requirement would not grow in the future (See J.E. Mueller. War Presidents and Public Opinion. New York: Wiley, 1973. P. 364; S. Verbaet. Al. “Public Opinion and the War in Vietnam” American Political Science Review. 61 (June 1967). PP. 321-322). Hence the debate became “how to attain the national objectives with limited resources, how to modify the objectives without abandoning them completely, how to regain public acceptance for subsequent American actions in South Vietnam” (H.Y. Schandler. The Unmaking of a President: Lyndon Johnson and Vietnam. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977. P.338).

The view of a military stalemate began to be reflected in the media and colored the atmosphere in which the decisions were made. The President recognized that without renouncing the former policy a new direction with a less costly strategy had to be found.

As the Viet Cong had lost heavily during the Tet offensive, General Westmoreland felt that the war could be won sooner by increasing the American forces. Hence Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff E. Wheeler and General W. Westmoreland settled the figure of 206,000 additional troops. But a point had already reached where no more forces could be committed without mobilizing reserves. Hence Wheeler insisted the need for large – scale reinforcements and concluded that without additional troops the U.S. must be prepared to accept reserves. On February 28, 1968 Wheeler presented Westmoreland’s request of 206,000 additional troops to the government. The report shocked the government. On the one hand Wheeler had suggested that denial of the additional troops might lead to a military defeat. On the other hand, acceptance of his recommendation could result in a major escalation of the war (For details see Wheeler Report. February, 1968. in PP.NYT ed. PP. 615-621). In this situation the President, unwilling to approve the request for additional troops, asked the Secretary of Defense designate C.M. Clifford to undertake a complete and searching assessment of the entire U.S. strategy and commitment in South Vietnam (For details of the reappraisal of the Vietnam policy in the aftermath of the Tet offensive, see T. Hoopes. The Limits of Intervention: An Inside Account of how the Johnson Policy of Escalation in Vietnam was Reversed. New York: David Mckay Company, Inc., 1973. PP. 139-201). Clifford’s advisers were agreed that Westmoreland should be given no more than a token increase in troops and suggested that ARVN assume greater responsibility in the war. The Clifford Memorandum to the President maintained that “The current strategy can promise no early end to the conflict nor any success in attributing the enemy or eroding Hanoi’s will to fight… we can obtain our objective only if the GVN begins to take the steps necessary to gain the confidence of the people and to provide effective leadership for the diverse groups in the population. ARVN must also be turned into an effective fighting force. If we fail in these objectives, a military victory over the NVN/VC main forces followed by a U.S. withdrawal, would only pave way for and NLF takeover – our military presence in South Vietnam should be designed to buy time during which ARVN and GVN can develop effective capability. In order to do this, we must deny the enemy access to the populated areas of the country and prevent him from achieving his objectives of controlling the population and destroying the GVN” (See PP. Gravel ed. Vol. IV. PP. 563 – 564). 

The memorandum had suggested a reduced cost strategy concomitant with a “Vietnamization” of the war and a deliberate policy of minimizing American causalities. According to the “Vietnamization” policy American forces would remain in South Vietnam for a time to prevent the military defeat of South Vietnam by communist forces, to stimulate negotiations with North Vietnam and to provide shield behind which South Vietnamese government could rally, try to become effective and win support of the people. This American commitment would gradually be reduced as South Vietnamese become capable of meeting their own defense requirements. The restrictions on American deployments and emphasis on increased activity by the RVNAF necessitated a new strategy. Thus, after Tet the strategy began to change from one of increasing military pressure to a policy of de-escalation, Vietnamization, increased effort to pacify all of South Vietnam, and to build a viable nation coupled with withdrawal of U.S. forces and a stepped-up negotiation effort for a peace with honor (See H.Y. Schandler. Op. cit. P. 344; W.S. Thompson and D.D. Frizzel (eds) op. cit. P.152).

Johnson agreed with Clifford’s recommendations and was prepared to act upon them. But while the President was assessing the report of the Clifford Task Force, Westmoreland’s request of 206,000 additional American troops and the details of the debate created by the request within Johnson Administration were leaked to the press. The New York Times report on March 10, 1968 on these events set off a new debate in the Congress and in the Press, most of it highly critical of the contemplated troop commitment. In this background, there followed the strong showing of the “peace” candidate Senator Eugene McCarthy in the New Hampshire Primary on March 12 and the announcement by Senator Robert Kennedy on March 16 that he would seek the Democratic nomination for Presidency. Moreover, on March 18 nearly one-third of the House of Representatives joined in Congressional review of U.S. policy in Southeast Asia. By the time 78 percent of the Americans were certain that U.S. was bogged down in Vietnam and doubted whether Johnson could break the stalemate. In this situation in order to attain the American objectives in Vietnam in a manner acceptable to the American people it became inevitable for the Johnson Administration to commit itself to a political solution through a negotiated settlement of the conflict. Peace initiative became necessary to placate the American people (G. Lewy America in Vietnam. New York: Oxford University Press, 1978. P.132; H.Y. Schandler. Op. cit. P. 350; For details on the Public Opinion during the period see, P.W. Sperlich and W.L. Lunch. “American Public Opinion and the War in Vietnam”. Peace and Change. X (Spring 1984). PP. 1-22; M. Small. “Impact of the Antiwar Movement on Lyndon Johnson 1965 – 1968” Western Political Quarterly. 32 (March 1979). PP. 21 – 44). Hence President authorized the deployment of only 13,500 support troops in response to Westmoreland’s request 206,000 additional army troops. The forces now allocated were far below those deemed necessary by the military to pursue its optimum strategic concept and defeat the Viet Cong within a short period. On March 22 Johnson announced that Westmoreland would be recalled from Vietnam to become a new Army Chief of Staff. About the factors that led to the denial of the request for a buildup in American troop levels, Johnson wrote “First and most important, it was our collective judgment that another massive communist attack was increasingly unlikely. Second, the South Vietnamese were clearly improving military and getting shape to carry a heavier combat load. Third, our financial problems remained serious… Finally, domestic public opinion continued to be discouraged as a result of the Tet offensive and the way events in Vietnam had been presented to the American people in newspapers and on Television. Critics of our policy became more and more vocal as contention for the Presidential nomination heated up” (L.B. Johnson. The Vietnamese Point: Perspectives of the Presidency, 1963 – 1969. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971. P. 415).

On March 31, 1968 Johnson addressed the nation on the Television. He announced that he would not substantially add to the number of U.S. troops already in Vietnam and that he would make only a token increase in the size of American forces in response to the call of the military for major deployment of American forces. He assured that he would make the expansion and improvement of the South Vietnamese armed forces in order to make it capable of taking up a larger share of combat operations. He declared that he was halting all air and naval bombardment of North Vietnam above the 20^th parallel of latitude in order to move towards peace. Johnson also declared that he would not accept his party’s nomination for another term (For details see PPP. Lyndon B. Johnson 1968 – 1969. Washington D.C. U.S. G.P.O. 1970 Vol. I. P, 476; See also T. Hoopes op.cit. PP.202-224). Johnson’s speech represented only a shift of tactics to attain the objective of an independent, non-communist South Vietnam. The exigencies of the domestic politics required a policy of Vietnamization. John pledged to devote his remaining time and energies to the search for peace.

On April 3, 1968 North Vietnam agreed for talks. On May 3, 1968 agreement was reached on Paris as the site for peace discussions. Formal peace talks opened in Paris on May 13, 1968. But as soon as the peace talks began deadlock ensued. South Vietnamese President Thieu declared that his government would not accept. Any settlement of a coalition government if Saigon. U.S. was not ready to end the bombing of North Vietnam unless it had assurances that Hanoi would not increase its infiltration of the South. But Hanoi rejected the American demand for reciprocity and demanded immediate and unconditional halt to the bombing north of 20^th parallel before it would enter into serious peace discussions. Thus, the negotiations deadlocked and along with the deadlock the war continued. The Johnson Administration stepped up its military operation and kept intense pressure on the communist forces in order to strengthen the American position in South Vietnam. On October 31, 1968 Johnson Administration announced that it was halting all air, naval and artillery bombardment of North Vietnam effective on the next day. On November 1, 1968 North Vietnamese delegates in Paris announced that peace talks would start on November 6, 1968. From November 2 onwards, the dispute over the status of delegation began.