Following the assassination of President Kennedy, Vice President Johnson assumed the office of Presidency. The Johnson Administration’s Vietnam policy was essentially a continuation of that of Kennedy Administration. When Johnson took over the office of Presidency, Ho Chi Minh offered him, through UN Secretary General U. Tant, a general settlement of Vietnam conflict which would permanently neutralize South Vietnam in accordance with the Geneva accords of 1954. But Johnson rejected Ho’s offer saying that neutralization would only be another name for communist take-over. On November 26, 1963 President Johnson approved NSAM 273. It reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to South Vietnam and the continuation of the Vietnam programs and policies of the Kennedy Administration. The objective he set in South Vietnam was to assist “the people and government of that country to win their contest against the externally directed and supported communist conspiracy (PP.NYT ed. PP.238 -39; See also PP. Gravel ed. Vol. III. PP.17 -20).

In December 1963 Johnson sent McNamara to South Vietnam to evaluate the situation there. After the trip McNamara reported to Johnson on December 21, 1963 that the situation in South Vietnam was extremely disturbing. He opined that if the trends were not reversed, within the next 2 – 3 months South Vietnam would become a communist controlled state (See PP.Gravel ed. Vol.III. PP. 494- 96). This assessment laid foundation for further covert war and increased American aid to South Vietnam. On January 20, 1964 Deputy Commander General William C. Westmoreland became Commander of the United States Military Assistance Command (COMUSMACV). He had favored some new American military commitment in Vietnam. Over the next nine months, the number of American advisers increased from 16,300 to 23,300. The U.S. also expanded its economic assistance to South Vietnam.

Gradually the U.S. attention began shifting towards North Vietnam. The U.S. increased covert GVN operations against North Vietnam designed to impose progressively escalating pressure upon the North. The operations included intelligence over flights, dropping of propaganda leaflets, and OPLAN – 34 A. The OPLAN 34–A prescribed larger South Vietnamese intrusion into North Vietnam, bigger propaganda effort to stimulate a sense of fear among the people and marine operations such as interception of communist ships and eventual strategic air and naval attacks against North Vietnam. It also suggested amphibious invasion by the U.S. and South Vietnamese ground troops into North Vietnam (See K. Stanley. Op. cit. P.364; G.C. Herring. Op.cit. P.17).

1964 was Presidential election year. Johnson wanted to enter the campaign as a “peace” candidate. But he did not want to appear “soft” on communism. In March 1964, for a first-hand assessment of the situation in Vietnam Johnson sent Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Maxwell D. Taylor to Vietnam. After his return, in a memorandum to McNamara, Taylor said that the Joint Chiefs were increasingly mindful that the loss of South Vietnam to the communist would lead to the erosion of the U.S. position in Southeast Asia. Moreover, such a defeat would have disastrous consequences in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Later McNamara reported to Johnson that the consequences of a communist dominated South Vietnam would be extremely serious of the rest of Southeast Asia and for the U.S. position around the world (see PP. Gravel ed. Vol. II. PP. 193, 336). The McNamara – Taylor report was presented to the President on March 16, 1964. The report was approved by the President as NSAM 288 set the U.S. objective as an independent, non-communist South Vietnam. It took the position that South Vietnam must be free to accept outside assistance in the form of economic, social and military measures in order to maintain its security. Unless the U.S. could achieve this objective in South Vietnam, all of Southeast Asia would fall under communist domination. Thus, the threat to Laos, Cambodia, Burma, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, India, Australia, New Zealand, Taiwan, Korea and Japan would be greatly increased. Moreover, the impact of South Vietnam going under communist domination would not only be in Asia but also in the rest of the world where the South Vietnam conflict was regarded as a test case of U.S. capacity to help a nation to meet the communist “war of liberation”. The policy proposals of the memorandum included authorizing high-level U.S. over flights of South Vietnam’s border and South Vietnamese ground operations over the Laotian line for the purpose of border control. It also proposed and approved that the military forces prepare immediately to be in a position, on 72 hours’ notice to initiate Laotian and Cambodian ‘Boarder Control Actions’ and also suggested that the forces be in a position on 30 days’ notice to initiate the program of ‘graduated Overt Military Pressure’ against North Vietnam (see PP. Gravel ed. Vol. III. PP. 499 – 510).

Immediately after the approval of NSAM 288 the Defense Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff began planning for the implementation of its policy programs. During June – July 1964 the U.S. carried out various military measures in Vietnam. The military –political actions which were carried out with considerable publicity included the accelerated military construction effort in Thailand and South Vietnam, the propositioning of the contingency stockpiles in Thailand and the Philippines, the forward deployment of carrier task force and land based tactical aircraft within a close striking distance of relevant enemy targets and the assignment of an unprecedented high level “first team” to man the U.S. diplomatic mission in Saigon. All these measures were intended both to convince Hanoi and to reassure the GVN of the seriousness and durability of the U.S. commitment. The U.S. had also undertaken a number of unpublicized actions aimed at giving indications to the ‘enemy’ of the U.S. willingness and capacity to employ increased force if necessary. The most provocative among them were 34-A raids and DE SOTO Patrols. The 34-A Raids on the coastal areas of North Vietnam were carried out by the high-speed boats manned by commandos from South Vietnam and other countries who had been recruited, supported and led by CIA. The 34-A operations included flights over North Vietnam by U2 spy planes, kidnappings of North Vietnamese citizens for intelligence information, parachuting sabotage and psychological warfare teams in North, commando raids from the sea to blow up rail and high way bridges and the bombardment of North Vietnamese coastal installations by P.T. boats. DE SOTO Patrols conducted by U.S. destroyers deep into the Gulf of Tonkin along the cost of North Vietnam. The purpose of the patrols was to gather information on North Vietnam’s radar system and various other kinds of military intelligence. It also served the purpose of conducting a “show of strength”. Other military activities directed at North Vietnam in addition to 34-A operations and DE SOTO Patrols included Laotian air strikes and limited GVN cross boarder operations against Viet Cong infiltration routes in Laos, GVN maritime raids and other harassing actions against North Vietnam, YANKEE TEAM low level photo reconnaissance mission over Laos conducted by U.S. jet aircrafts with fighter escorts for suppressive for retaliatory actions against ‘enemy’ ground fire. On July 25, 1964 the U.S. reconnaissance planes based in Thailand began flying communications intercept missions off the North Vietnamese coast.

The clandestine 34-A raids against North Vietnam increased during summer. In the later part of July 1964, South Vietnam supported by U.S. naval vessels began a series of commando raids against the North Vietnamese radar and communications installations along the Tonkin coast. At midnight on July 30, the South Vietnamese navel commandos and General Westmoreland’s command staged an amphibious raid on the North Vietnamese islands of Hon Me and Hon Nieu in the Gulf of Tonkin. While the attack was occurring the U.S. destroyer Maddox was heading North into the Gulf of Tonkin on a DE SOTO intelligence gathering patrol. On August 2, it was reported that Maddox was attacked by North Vietnamese P.T. boats when it was in the international waters. On August 3, on President Johnson’s order Maddox reinforced by destroyer Turner Joy was back into the Gulf of Tonkin. According to the orders from the President, if attacked the ships were to attack and destroy the enemy. On the night of August 3, while DE SOTO patrol was being resumed, two more clandestine 34-A assault, North Vietnamese torpedo boats reportedly attacked both Maddox and Turner Joy. Based on the reports President Johnson ordered reprisal attacks against North Vietnam. The U.S. air attacks destroyed 25 torpedo boats and 10 percent of Hanoi’s oil reserves. It was the first direct U.S. attack on North Vietnam. Thus, the President for air attacks against North Vietnam was established (Ibid. P.291. PP.NYT ed. PP.246-248. For details on Tonkin Gulf incidents see W.C. Gibbsons. 1986. Part II. Op. cit. pp. 280-333; E.G. Windchy. Tonkin Gulf. New York: Double Day and Co., 1971; J.C. Goulden. Truth is the First Casualty: The Gulf of Tonkin Affair – Illusion and Reality. New York: Rand McNally, 1969).