In January 1961 John F. Kennedy became the President of the U.S. He was like Eisenhower, convinced that the situation in Vietnam was not simply civil war. In response to the Chinese and Soviet support to the “wars of national liberation”, Kennedy became preoccupied with counterinsurgency. The Kennedy Administration was convinced of the need for demonstrating America’s willingness and capacity to deal with the communist technique of guerilla warfare and also of the urgency to prove their toughness to Khrushchev. Soon after taking office Kennedy had approved a counterinsurgency plan. The U.S. and GVN began their attempts to end the insurgency in South Vietnam through ‘Strategic Hamlet Program’. Kennedy authorized a modest increase in the MAAG, of 100 advisers and dispatched to Vietnam 400 Special Forces troops to train the Vietnamese in counterinsurgency techniques (See PP. Gravel ed. Vol. II. PP. 128, 131). The Kennedy Administration was also convinced that communism was worldwide and was on the offensive. Hence NSAM 52 of May 11, 1961 approved “to prevent communist domination of South Vietnam, to create in that country a viable and increasingly democratic society and to initiate on an accelerated basis a series of mutually supporting actions of a military, political, economic, psychological and covert character to achieve this objective (PP.NYT ed. P.131).

Thus, the NSAM approved proposals for covert actions and also the deployment of 400 Special Forces Team. Thus in 1961 the Kennedy Administration waged covert warfare in Indochina. The U.S. send clandestine teams across the 17^th parallel to attack enemy supply lines, sabotage military and civilian targets and agitate against Hanoi regime.

By the spring of 1961 the Saigon government was in serious trouble. Hence President Kennedy sent Vice-President Johnson to evaluate the situation in South Vietnam. It was an important step in the evolution of the U.S. policy towards Vietnam. After the visit to Vietnam Johnson reported to Kennedy that “the fundamental decision required of the United States – and the time is of the greatest importance – is whether we are to attempt to meet the challenge of communist expansion now in Southeast Asia by major effort in support of the forces of freedom in the area or throw in the towel… I recommend we proceed with a clear-cut and strong program of action” (U.S. Department of Defense. United States – Vietnam Relations, 1945 – 1967. 12 Vols. Washington D.C. U.S. G.P.O. 1971. Bk.11. P.106 (Hereafter cited as PP. DOD ed.).

After Johnson’s visit, later that month Kennedy sent Eugene Staley, an expert in counterinsurgency tactics to South Vietnam. He recommended the creation of a series of well-fortified ‘Strategic Hamlets’ in order to keep the Viet Cong away from the country side. The Hamlets were to be implemented with the assistance of U.S. military advisers and to be protected by South Vietnamese militia men. In the meantime, infiltration into South Vietnam increased. Hence the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the National Security Council considered the introduction of sizable American combat troops into Vietnam. But Kennedy still has reservations. Hence in October 1961 he sent General Maxwell Taylor and Walter Rostow to South Vietnam to evaluate the situation there. After his return Taylor endorsed the Stanley plan. He also recommended large scale military aid to South Vietnam and also the introduction of American military forces in order to arrest the deterioration of the political and military situation in South Vietnam. He also proposed the dispatch of an 8000 ‘logistic task force’. Taylor contented that all these were necessary because if South Vietnam goes to the communists, the faith that the U.S. has the will and capacity to deal with the communist offensive in that area, will be lost (for details see PP. NYT ed. PP. 146 -153). Kennedy approved the Taylor recommendation to increase American aid and advisers. But he rejected the logistical task force proposal and did not send troops.

The memorandum on Taylor report submitted by McNamara to Kennedy on November 8, 1961 took the position that the fall of South Vietnam to communism would lead to the rapid extension of communist control over Southeast Asia and Indochina. This in turn would have serious strategic implications world-wide. Only the introduction of the U.S. forces could prevent the fall of South Vietnam. Hence McNamara recommended to commit the U.S. to the objective of preventing the fall of South Vietnam to communism and to support the commitment by necessary military actions (Ibid. PP. 153 -155). The Rusk – McNamara memorandum of November 11, 1961 adopted by Kennedy took the position that the loss of South Vietnam to communism would lead the remainder of Southeast Asia and Indonesia to a complete accommodation with communism. As the U.S. had commitments to South Vietnam under SEATO treaty, the loss of South Vietnam to communism would not only destroy SEATO, but would undermine the credibility of American commitment elsewhere. Hence, they recommended that the U.S. commit itself to the clear objective of preventing the fall of South Vietnam to communism. This objective had to be accomplished by making the government of South Vietnam capable of winning its own war against the guerrillas with large scale U.S. military, economic and political assistance. Moreover, they cautioned that it might also become necessary not only introducing U.S. combat forces, but also striking at the source of the ‘aggression’ in North Vietnam (Ibid.PP.155-156)

Hence by late 1961 the American assistance to South Vietnam steadily increased. President Kennedy approved a substantial increase in the number of American advisers who were allowed to participate in combat missions. The declarations emanating from the Administration reached a position from which it could back track without jeopardizing the credibility of American commitments.

Between 1961 and 1962 the American military assistance to South Vietnam was more than doubled in order to support the counterinsurgency programs. The number of American “advisers” was increased from 3205 in 1961 to more than 9000 in 1962. They performed varied and ever widening talks. The massive infusion of men and weapons boosted the morale of South Vietnamese army. During the period Kennedy also authorized the use of defoliants and herbicides in South Vietnam. But it turned the people against the Diem government. In 1962 the South Vietnamese army with the support of American military equipment and advisers began to undertake offensive actions against the Viet Cong. By February 1962 the U.S. began to implement the Stanley Pan and thus the Diem government adopted the so-called ‘Strategic Hamlet Program’. The program was designed to isolate Viet Cong from the people of South Vietnam. Its ultimate objective was to reduce the Viet Cong to ‘hungry marauding bands of out-laws devoting all their energies to remaining alive’ and to force them out of their hide-outs where they would have to fight the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) on its terms (R. Hilsman. To Move a Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy. New York: Doubleday, 1967. P.432). But the programs could not accomplish its goal.

In 1962 when the Laotian agreement was announced, the National Liberation Front (NLF) if South Vietnam proposed a similar agreement for the settlement of the Vietnam conflict. It called for withdrawal of all foreign troops from South Vietnam, restoration of Geneva accords, establishment of a coalition government elected by universal suffrage and the gradual reunification of Vietnam through political process. But Kennedy insisted that he would negotiate only with the government of North Vietnam. But Ho Chi Minh denied that he controlled NLF. Meanwhile President Diem was unwilling to negotiate with anyone. Thus, the opportunity for peace missed.

In the meantime, Diem’s authoritarian policies alienated the people from his government. Diem’s popularity was dwindling. In June 1963 Buddhist protests emerged into a powerful political movement that threatened the survival of Diem’s government. Hence Diem made an attempt to suppress the Buddhist demonstration against his government. Diem’s proved inability to conciliate the dissident groups in the face of growing communist challenge brought the Kennedy Administration to the conclusion that the war against the Vietminh could not be won under the aegis of Diem Administration. In that situation U.S. had only three choices: either continue support for Diem or encourage or tacitly support the overthrow of Diem or disengage from Vietnam. But as South Vietnam was considered very important, the U.S. supported the coup which led to the assassination of Diem. According to the Pentagon Papers the U.S. had a significant role in the military coup d’état against Diem. From August 1963 onwards the U.S. had authorized, sanctioned and encouraged the coup efforts of the Vietnamese generals and offered full support for the successor government. In October, 1963 the U.S. cut aid to Diem government to give the green signal to the generals. Moreover the U.S. maintained clandestine contact with the generals throughout the planning and execution of the coup (For details see PP. Gravel ed. Vol. II. P. 201-207; See also W.C. Gibbsons. The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War: Executive and Legislative Roles and Relationships. Part II. 1961 – 1964. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986. PP. 137 – 208).

The fall of Diem created a gaping political vacuum in South Vietnam and led to greater political instability and lack of progress. The Viet Cong activity increased dramatically. The complicity of the U.S. in the overthrow of Diem heightened its responsibilities and deepened its commitments towards South Vietnam. As the stakes of preserving an anti-communist South Vietnam was very high, President Kennedy determined to prevent the imminent collapse of the South Vietnamese government.