US IN VIETNAM WAR DURING EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION
The arrival of the Republican Administration in 1953 deepened the American commitment in Indochina. It followed the basic policy of Truman Administration and deepened the American commitment to containment of communism in Asia. It was determined to prevent the loss of Indochina to communism by taking a more forthright anti-communist stand. It had agreed that Ho Chi Minh was an instrument of international communism and that the fall of Indochina would cause the loss of all of Southeast Asia with disastrous political, economic and strategic consequences for the U.S. Hence Eisenhower Administration gave firm assurance of continued assistance to the French. With the intensification of the French – Vietnam war and the deterioration of the French military position by mid-1953, forced the U.S. to take a position on the possible U.S. military intervention in order to avert a Vietminh military victory and also the increasingly likely contingency of negotiations between the French and Vietminh to end the war through a political settlement. The U.S. tried to dissuade the French from negotiations and urged the French to drive towards a military victory. In August 1953, the NSC took the position that any negotiated settlement would lead not only to the loss of Indochina but of the whole Southeast Asia. As this was considered critical to the security of the U.S. the American goal was determined to be nothing short of a “military victory”.
Moreover, with the growing perception of a Chinese threat to Indochina and therefore to all of Southeast Asia, the U.S. government tended to focus on the military rather than the political aspects of the French – Vietminh struggle. Consequently, the American attention focused on deterring external intervention from China. In a speech on September 2, 1953, Dulles warned China that an intervention in Indochina would cause grave consequences which might not be confined to Indochina. Moreover, the NSC 162/2 of October 30, 1953 reiterated that Indochina was of such strategic importance that an attack on it would “compel the United States to react with military force either locally at the point of attack, or generally against the military power of the aggressors (PP. Gravel ed. Vol. I.PP. 55, 86-87, 412 – 429; Neil Sheehan et al. The Pentagon Papers as Published by the New York Times. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1971. PP.11-12. (Hereafter cited as PP.NYT ed.)
By March 1954 the Vietminh had surrounded Dien Bien Phu so tightly that only the introduction of the U.S. ground combat troops could save it from a communist takeover. Thus, when the French asked for U.S. military intervention at Dien Bien Phu the Eisenhower Administration’s position was that it would intervene only with the Congressional approval and in concert with its European and Far Eastern allies as part of a combined force. But the U.S. could not get the allied support; it did not intervene militarily to salvage the French in Dien Bien Phu. Subsequently on May 7, 1954 Dien Bien Phu fell to the Vietminh communist forces (For details See M.B. Yun. Decision Against War: Eisenhower and Dien Bien Phuj 1954. New York: Columbia University Press, 1988. PP. 1-160; G.C. Herring and R.V. Immerman. “Eisenhower Dulles and Dien Bien Phu: The ‘Day we didn’t Go to War’ Revisited” Journal of American History. 72 (September 1985) PP.343-363).
The U.S. assistance to the French which began with a modest sum of 10 million dollars in 1950 reached 1.063 billion dollars by 1954. The total American aid to the French amounted to 2.6 million dollars. By 1954 American aid exceeded 78% of the French expenditure on the conflict. In addition, the aid to the Bao Dai government to bolster its popularity with Vietnamese people amounted to 126 million (See PP.Gravel ed. Vol. I. p.77).
The Geneva conference was held from May 8 to July 21, 1954. The discussion of the Indochina problem at the Geneva conference began on May 8, 1954. On May 12, 1954 President Eisenhower sent certain instructions to the U.S. envoy at the Geneva talks. According to the instructions the U.S. was participating in the Indochina phase of the conference in order to assist the nations of the area to arrive at certain decisions which would help them not to be amalgamated into the communist bloc. It also made clear that the U.S. was not prepared to approve any settlement “which would have the effect of subverting the existing lawful governments” of Indochina or jeopardizing the French forces in Indochina. (PP.NYT ed. P. 43). On July 7, 1954 Dulles sent a cable to the embassies of London, Saigon, and Paris and U.S. envoy at the Geneva talks. It said “Thus since undoubtedly true that elections might eventually mean unification Vietnam under Ho Chi Minh this make it all more important, they should be only held as long after cease-fire agreement as possible and in conditions free from intimidation to give democratic elements best chance. We believe important that no date should be set now and especially that no conditions should be accepted by French which would have direct or indirect effect of preventing effective international supervision of agreement ensuring political as well as military guarantees (Ibid. P.46).
The Geneva accords final declaration was signed by French and Vietminh on July 21, 1954. According to the accords Vietnam was to be partitioned along the 17th parallel to permit the regrouping of military forces from both sides. It prohibited the introduction of foreign troops, military personnel and all kinds of arms and munitions into Vietnam. It also prohibited establishing military base under the control of a foreign state in the regrouping zone. The Conference recognized the purpose of the agreement relating to Vietnam as to settle the military questions for ending hostilities. It also emphasized that the demarcation line was provisional and that it should not be interpreted as constituting a political or territory boundary. It also proposed a general election to be held in July 1956 under the supervision of an International Commission composed of the representatives of Canada, Poland and India. Consultations for the same had to be begun between the authorities of the two zones from July 20, 1955 onwards (Ibid. PP. 50-51; For more details see Appendix II). But the U.S. refused to be associated with the final declaration and issued its own unilateral declaration which stated that though it would refrain from the threat or use of force to disturb the agreement, it “would view any renewal of the aggression in violation of the aforesaid agreements with grave concern and as seriously threatening international peace and security” and reiterated that “peoples are entitled to determine their own future and that it will not join in an agreement which would hinder this” (PP.NYT ed. P.52. For more details see Appendix II. For a discussion on the Accords see R.F. Randle. Geneva 1954: The Settlement of the Indochinese War. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969; Anthony Eden. Memoirs: Full Circle. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1960; PP. Gravel ed. PP.108-178).
In the meanwhile, in accordance with the plan for general covert operations against international communism approved by the NSC 5412 under the title “National Security Council Directive on Covert Operations” on March 15, 1954, the U.S. began conducting covert operations in Vietnam. The Eisenhower Administration sent a team headed by Lansdale to conduct secret operations against the Vietminh. The team known as the Saigon Military Mission (SMM) entered Vietnam on June 1, 1954. It was supposed to enter Vietnam quietly and assist the Vietnamese in unconventional warfare. The broad mission of the team was to undertake paramilitary operations against the Vietminh and to wage a political – psychological warfare in Vietnam. But after the Geneva conference, the mission was slightly modified as to prepare the means for undertaking paramilitary operations in North Vietnam. The team played an important role in assisting as well as maximizing the massive movement of refugees from North to South during and after the Geneva conference. As B.B. Fall wrote “… the mass flight was admittedly the result of an extremely intensive, well conducted and in terms of its objective very successful American psychological warfare operation. Propaganda slogans and leaflets appealed to the devout Catholics with such themes as “Christ has gone to the South”, and the “Virgin Mary has departed from the North…” (B.B. Fall. The Two Vietnams: A Political and Military Analysis. New York: Frederick Praeger, 1967. PP. 153-154).
During the period from August 1954 to August 1955 the team conducted various types of clandestine operations. The team assisted Diem to stay in power, attempted to destroy modern presses in Hanoi, and contaminated the oil supply of the Hanoi bus company for gradual wreckage of engines in the buses, hired Vietnamese astrologers for making dire predictions for the Vietminh and good omens for Diem’s government and gave secret training to the Vietnamese to conduct clandestine operations in North Vietnam (For details see PP. NYT ed. PP.54-67). A former official of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) described the covert and clandestine CIA program in Vietnam, during 1954-1955 by the U.S. government, that “No facet of CIA’s intelligence or operations functions was ignored in the fight for Indochina. Intelligence agents were dispatched by sea, air and land into communist held areas. Operators worked in the Chinese target, the Vietnamese target, the Pathet Lao target, the Viet Cong target. Counter intelligence assumed a higher priority to build up a competent South Vietnamese Security Service to help train the police, to infiltrate the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong intelligence and security units. CIA – alone or in collaboration with South Vietnamese or other American agencies – carried out psychological warfare programs and played a serious role in the political action operations designed to advance the cause to which Washington had committed itself (Quoted in W.C. Gibbsons. Part I. 1986.op. cit. P.310)
In the aftermath of the Geneva Conference, the major American effort was to set up a stable South Vietnamese government that could get the allegiance of the Vietnamese nationalists. On June 18, 1954 emperor Bao Dai had selected Ngo Dinh Diem as his Premier. Initially Diem did not have a firm assurance of U.S. support. The Cao Dai and Hou Hao Buddhist sects and the Binh Xuyen groups did not recognize Diem as the head of the government. In this situation, while the Joint Chiefs were reluctant to train South Vietnamese army until Diem had a stable government; Dulles argued that training Diem’s army was the best means to strengthen his government. Thus, on August 18, 1954 Dulles informed Mendes-France about the U.S. backing for Diem and also that henceforth the U.S. would deal directly with the Diem government. The NSC 5429/2 of August 20, 1954 made clear the U.S. intention to give direct aid to the Vietnamese and to work with Premier Diem politically (See PP. NYT ed. P.15). After a visit to Vietnam Senator Mansfield reported that there is no alternative to Diem and urged the Eisenhower Administration to support the Diem government. On October 23, 1954 President Eisenhower sent a letter to Premier Diem. The letter represented a new era in the U.S. relations with Vietnam. In the letter Eisenhower offered direct American aid to Diem government in order to assist GVN (Government of Vietnam) in “developing and maintaining a strong viable state capable of resisting attempted subversion or aggression through means (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States Dwight D. Eisenhower. 1954. Washington U.S. G.P.O. P. 949. (Hereafter cited as PPP).
The timely American support enabled Diem to thwart a series of military plots against his government. The U.S. also enabled Diem to cope with the massive influx of refugees from the North. One of the biggest challenges for Diem in the early years of his administration was the Binh Xuyen forces. Diem refused to negotiate with Binh Xuyen. Hence the Binh Xuyen forces challenged Diem in April 1955. But Diem’s army routed the forces. Encouraged by Diem’s success against the Binh Xuyen forces the U.S. reaffirmed and declared its unequivocal support for Diem (For details see PP. Gravel ed. Vol. I. P. 183; G.C. Herring. Op.cit. pp.51-55; K. Stanley. Op.cit. pp. 222-223).
The May 1955 NSC on U.S. policy on All-Vietnam elections held that “to give no impression of blocking elections, while avoiding the possibility of losing those, Diem should insist on free elections by secret ballot with strict supervision. Communists in Korea and Germany had rejected these conditions; hopefully the Vietminh will follow suit” (PP.NYT. ed.P.22).
By the time deadlines for the election consultation fell due in July 1955, backed by the U.S., Diem obdurately refused to open talks with the Hanoi government. On July 16, 1955 Diem announced that his government was not bound by the Geneva accords as it had not been a party to them. He also declared that elections scheduled for the following year would not be held until Ho Chi Minh’s government adopted democratic political procedures and processes. Though this was an obvious violation of the Geneva agreements, the U.S. did not oppose Diem’s position (PP. Gravel ed. Vol. I. PP. 183, 245, 266).
On October 23, 1955 Diem held a national referendum to determine whether Bao Die should be deposed and a public proclaimed under his leadership. In several places votes for Diem exceeded the number of registered voters. Diem claimed to have won 98.2 percent of the vote. Three days later the Republic Vietnam was proclaimed and Diem designated himself as the president of the Republic. B.B. Fall commented on the referendum that “there is not the slightest doubt that this plebiscite was only a shade more fraudulent than most electoral tests under a dictatorship” (B.B. Fall. 1967. op.cit. P.257. See also J. Buttinger. Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled. 2 Vols. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967. Vol. II. PP. 942 -943).
But the U.S. government hailed the results of the referendum stating that “we are glad to see the evolution of orderly and effective democratic process in an area of Southeast Asia which has been and continues to be threatened by communist efforts to impose totalitarian control” (Department of State Bulletin. November 7, 1955. PP. 356 (Hereafter cited as DSB).
A cable gram sent to the U.S. embassy in Saigon on December 11, 1955, reveals the U.S. position on Geneva accords. It said “while we should certainly take no positive step to speed up the present process of decay of Geneva accords… neither should we make the slightest effort to infuse life it to them” (PP.NYT ed. P. 23)
According to the NSC 5612 of 1956 the U.S. position on the General elections was to “support the position of the government of Free Vietnam that all-Vietnam elections may take place only after it is satisfied that genuinely free elections can be held throughout both zones of Vietnam” (Ibid. PP. 24-25)
The basic policy of the U.S. during this period was to assist South Vietnam in order to enable it become an ‘attractive contrast’ to the communist North Vietnam and work towards the weakening of the communist North and South Vietnam to bring about the reunification of Vietnam under an anti-communist leadership (Ibid. PP. 25-26)
As South Vietnam was waxing strong with the U.S. aid, Diem decided to replace France with America. Thus, in January 1956 the Diem government asked the French government to withdraw its remaining 35000 troops in Vietnam. Hence by April 26, 1956 the French military command in Vietnam was dissolved. Thus, on the due date for general elections agreed to at Geneva, the French possessed no military forces in Vietnam. The North Vietnamese government requested the International Control commission to help arrange the national elections call for by the Geneva accord. But Diem refused to cooperate with International Control Commission and the elections were not held. After the eventful passing of the date for elections in 1956, the U.S. was hopeful that Diem had succeeded. Thus, having ensured the survival of the Diem regime the U.S. began supporting it with the objective of preserving an independent, non-communist South Vietnam as a bulwark against further communist penetration in Southeast Asia. Thus by 1956 the Eisenhower Administration began the process of nation building in South Vietnam and assumed from France full responsibility for training the Vietnamese army. The Military Assistance and Advisory Group (MAAG) in Saigon undertook a crash program to build up the South Vietnamese army into an effective force.
Under MAAG’s direction the U.S. recognized, equipped and trained the South Vietnamese army to fight a conventional war. The U.S. provided roughly 85 million dollars per year in military equipment. It paid salaries of officers and men and financed the construction of military installations. In addition, the U.S. provided large amounts of money in foreign aid to South Vietnam. From 1955 to 1959 the direct U.S. economic assistance to South Vietnam was more than 127 million dollars and technical aid more than 16 million dollars. The American money and technology helped in repairing the vast damages resulted from more than a decade of war and rebuilding highways, railroads and canals. American specialists helped in promoting the development of new crops and established credit facilities for small farmers and thus caused an increase in the agricultural productivity. American educators supervised the founding of schools and furnished text books. Public health experts provided drugs and medical supplies and assisted in the training of nurses and paramedics. The public administration specialists trained Vietnamese civil servants. By 1960 there were more than 1500 Americans in South Vietnam assisting the government in various ways (See G.C. Herring. Op.cit. PP.56-63; For details of the U.S. military role in Vietnam by 1960. See R.H. Spector. Advice and Support: The Early Years of the United States Army in Vietnam, 1941 – 1960. New York: The Free Press, 1985. PP.77 – 373).
ORIGINS OF INSURGENCY
From 1957 onwards, incidents attributed to Viet Cong began to occur in the country side. The Eisenhower – Diem Joint Statement of May 11, 1957 had noted that “aggression or subversion threatening the political independence of the Republic of Vietnam would be considered as endangering peace and stability” (DSB. May 27, 1957. P. 851)
Diem applied the term ‘Viet Cong’ to mean all persons or groups who resorted to clandestine political activity or armed opposition against his government. Diem’s counter measures against the insurgency increased peasant discontent and heightened popular antagonism towards his government. Diem’s inattention to the needs of the people and his reckless suppression of dissident stirred a rising discontent among the people. The anti-communist South Vietnamese exiles in Paris organized the National Salvation Movement in January 1957 to combat Diem’s dictatorship. By 1959 Diem perceived that he was under serious attack and reacted strongly. He launched “agro Ville” program aimed at relocating the peasantry in areas where the army could protect them the Viet Cong. But the program spawned enormous rural discontent with the government and hence was eventually abandoned. Throughout 1960 insurgency grew unchecked in the country side and the level of violence increased sharply. Diem’s arbitrary and authoritarian methods gradually alienated important segments of population. The regime’s unpopularity was made clear when on April 30, 1960, eighteen prominent South Vietnamese political and military leaders denounced Diem’s repressive rule and urged for reforms. But they were subsequently arrested. In November 1960 dissident soldiers under the command of colonel Nguyen Chanh Thi surrounded Diem’s palace to force him to reform. But diem suppressed the revolt (PP. Gravel ed. Vol. I P.242, 258-259; G.C. Herring. Op.cit. PP.67-70). According to A.M. Schlesinger. Jr. “Diem’s authoritarianism which increasingly involved man hunts, political re-education camps, and the ‘re-groupment’ of population caused spreading discontent and then armed resistance on the country side. It is not easy to disentangle the events of these murky years; but few scholars believe that the growing resistance was at the start organized or directed by Hanoi. Indeed, there is some indication that the communists at first hung back. It is not until September 1960 that the communist party of North Vietnam bestowed the formal blessing and called for the liberation of the South from American imperialism” (PP. Gravel ed. Vol. I. P. 252).
In the words of G.M. Kahin and J.W. Lewis “contrary to the United States policy assumptions all available evidence shows that the revival of the civil war in the south in 1958 was undertaken by southerners at their own – not Hanoi’s initiative… Insurgency activity against the Saigon government began in the South under Southern leadership not as a consequence of any dictate from Hanoi but contrary to Hanoi’s injunctions” (Ibid. P.260).
But the official American position was that the DRV manipulated the entire war. The U.S. was convinced that the rebellion was instigated by North Vietnam and behind North Vietnam lurked the menacing shadow of communist China. Hence the U.S. portrayed Diem as a genuine Vietnamese nationalist and thoroughgoing democrat and stepped up military aid to Diem government. By 1960 there were 900 U.S. military advisers in South Vietnam. The U.S. began to shift the emphasis of its military programs from conventional warfare to counterinsurgency. Om 1960 special American teams were sent to train the South Vietnamese Ranger Battalion and U.S. advisers were placed at the regimental level to give on the spot advice and assess the capabilities and need of individual units (PP. Gravel ed. Vol. I. P.243. G.C. Herring. Op. cit. PP. 69-70)
In September 1960 North Vietnam’s Third Communist Party Congress called for the violent overthrow of Diem and denounced the U.S. role in Southeast Asia. Two months later communist China announced that it would support “wars of national liberation” against colonial oppressors. On December 20, 1960 the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam was formally organized. From its inception it was designed to encompass all anti-GVN activists. It gave a political articulation and leadership to those who were dissatisfied with Diem Administration. On January 6, 1961 Khrushchev pledged support for the “wars of national liberation” going on in Cuba, Algeria and Vietnam (see PP. Gravel ed. Vol. I. PP.258 – 260).