The U.S. was vitally concerned about the Indochinese region since 1940. Of the three Indochinese states of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, Vietnam was considered as the most important. The U.S. foreign policy towards Indochina during the Second World War was characterized by ambivalence. Because on the one hand the U.S. had reassured the French or its colonial possession and on the other hand it had vehemently advocated independence for Indochina, though President Roosevelt was in favor of independence for Indochina, he felt that Indochina was not ready for an immediate independence. Thus, he favored a short-term U.N. trusteeship in order to prepare the region for national self-determination. But Roosevelt’s trusteeship plan was vehemently opposed by Britain. Hence Roosevelt reserved the Indochina issue as a matter for post war decision (See Senator Mike Gravel (ed). The Pentagon Papers: The Defense Department History of United States Decision Making in Vietnam. 4 Vols. Boston: Beacon Press, 1971. Vol. I. P.293(Hereafter cited as PP. Gravel ed); See also U.S. Department of State. Foreign Relations and the United States. 1945. Vol. VI. P.293. (Hereafter cited as FRUS); G.R. Hess. “Franklin D. Roosevelt and Indochina” Journal of American History. LIX (September 1972) PP.353-368)

The Vietminh political party was organized in May 1941 under the leadership of Ho Chi Min. It was dedicated to the national independence of Vietnam and had enlisted support of even the non-communist Vietnamese nationalists. By 1945 the Vietminh had become the dominant political force in Vietnam and established itself as the voice of Vietnamese nationalism. When Second World War ended in August 1945 and Japan surrendered the Vietminh occupied government headquarters in Hanoi and took control of much of the country. On September 2, 1945 Ho Chi Min proclaimed the independence Vietnam from French rule.

The American perception of the Soviet behavior had caused a major re-orientation had caused a major re-orientation in the American thinking about the post war world. The Truman Administration decided not to champion any scheme of international trusteeship that would weaken and alienate the European states whose help the U.S. needed to balance the Soviet power in Europe. The U.S. needed a strong French alley in Europe and in the Far East. Hence the U.S. ignored Vietnam’s pleas for American recognition of its independence and assured the French that it would not stand in the way of the restoration of French sovereignty in Indochina. In October 1945 the U.S. declared that it had no thought of opposing the re-establishment of French control in Indochina (PP. Gravel ed. Vol. I.PP.16-17). The U.S. finally took the position that it “recognizes French sovereignty over Indochina. It is however the general policy of the United States to favor a policy which would allow colonial people an opportunity to prepare themselves for increased participation in their own government with eventual self-government as the goal (W.C. Gibbsons. The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War. Executive and Legislative Roles and Relationships. Part I. 1945 – 1960. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1986. P.21).

Thus, during September 1945 French forces began re-entering Vietnam. The U.S. acquiesced in the return of the French troops to Vietnam. The Vietminh did not have a firm power base in Southern Vietnam. Hence with the cooperation of the British occupation forces the French expelled the Vietminh from Saigon and re-established control over the Southern part of Vietnam. When the allied occupation of Indochina was officially over on April 10, 1946 the French forces were positioned in all Vietnam’s major cities. The return of the French created an explosive situation in Vietnam. The French and Vietminh attempted to negotiate an agreement. Due to their irreconcilable goals, the negotiations dragged on inconclusively. On November 26, 1946 the French shelled Haiphong killing 6000 civilians. Consequently, by the end of 1946 the French and the Vietminh were engaged in an all-out war. Though the U.S. expressed its concern over the conflict, it continued to regard the war as a matter for French resolution (PP. Gravel ed. Vol. I. P 28).

During 1945-1946 Ho Chi Minh wrote a number of letters to the U.S. government but they were officially ignored. Though the U.S. deplored the prospect of a protracted war, it stopped short of endorsing Ho, deterred by his history of communist affiliation, by 1947 the Truman Administration officials concluded that Ho’s communist “connection” might serve Kremlin’s purposes. Thus, gradually the U.S. policy got gravitated with the of France. So, during the first three years of Indochina war, the U.S. maintained a distinctly pro-French ‘neutrality” and the Truman Administration gave the French covert financial and military aid (PP. Gravel ed. Vol.I P.28. K. Staley. Vietnam: The War Nobody Won. New York: Foreign Policy Association. 1983. P.160).

The possibility of a French defeat in Vietnam along with the communist victory in China brought forth in early 1950 the U.S. decision to support France in Indochina. Among the Associated States of Indochina, Vietnam was considered as the key area. By the end of 1949 France had concluded an agreement with premier Bao Dai giving him control over the internal affairs of the Republic of Vietnam. The French announced the formal ratification of the independence of the Vietnamese on February 2, 1950. Thus, when the Republic was formally established, the U.S. granted diplomatic recognition to Bao Dai Government and soon established a full-fledged embassy in Saigon. The U.S. also initiated plans to support the Bao Dai government with economic and technical assistance. In the meantime, Soviet Union and China granted diplomatic recognition to Ho Chi Minh’s government as the legal authority for all Vietnam. Thus, the lines for the struggle in Vietnam were sharply drawn in February 1950. The French request for U.S. aid followed soon. The choice then confronting the U.S. was of either supporting the French in Indochina or facing the extension of communism over the remainder of Southeast Asia and even westward. Hence the U.S. decided to support the French in Indochina. Thus, the American aid to the French began with a package of 10 million dollars in 1950. In 1950 the U.S. sent to Vietnam a Military Assistance and Advisory Group (MAAG) to screen the French requests for aid, to assist in the training of Vietnamese soldiers and to advice on strategy (See FRUS. 1950. Vol. VI. PP.711-715).

The U.S. decision to become involved in the war in Indochina was made on April 24, 1950 when President Truman approved National Security Council (NSC) 64 which took the position that the U.S. should take all practicable measures in order to prevent any further communist expansion in Southeast Asia. Indochina, the key area of Southeast Asia, was perceived to be under immediate threat (FRUS. 1950. Vol. VI. PP.745-747). The situation in which the decision was made, was completely dominated by the consolidation of power by the communists in China. The rationale of the decision was that the Soviet controlled expansion of communism both in Europe and in Asia required a counter in Indochina, in the interest of the U.S. national security. Given this anti-communist position of the U.S. it was inevitable that it associates itself with France’s undertaking in Indochina. Thus, the perception of a powerful communist threat to American world interests, the victory of communists in China and the apparent alignment of Peking with Moscow, all combined to induce Washington to action. The official announcement of the U.S. assistance program to the French and the Indochinese states came on May 8, 1950 when Acheason said that “the United States government, convinced that neither national independence nor democratic evolution exist in any area dominated by Soviet imperialism, consider the situation to be such as to warrant it according economic aid and military equipment to the Associated States of Indochina and to France in order to assist them in restoring stability and permitting these states to pursue their peaceful and democratic development” (PP.Gravel ed. Vol. I. P. 42; 186; 179-184)

The outbreak of Korean war on June 25, 1950 marked the beginning of the globalization of the U.S. commitment towards containment. All communists everywhere began to be considered as equally dangerous? The North Korean attack on South Korea increased the U.S. determination to resist communism. It suddenly sharpened the thoughts and actions of the American with respect to Southeast Asia. The French struggle in Indochina began to be seen as an integral part of the containment of communism. Hence the U.S. intensified and enlarged its aid programs in Indochina. Military aid to Indochina acquired in 1951 the second largest priority just behind the Korean War program. The U.S. aid to Indochina amounted to 133 million dollars. It also ordered large quantities of arms and ammunition, naval vessels, aircrafts and military vehicles. Thus the U.S. bolstered French defense. In order to strengthen the governments of Indochina and increase their popular appeal the U.S. established a program of economic and technical assistance in 1950 and spent more than 50 million dollars in various projects during 1950-52. The American experts provided fertilizer and seeds to increase agricultural production, constructed dispensaries, developed malaria control program and distributed food and cloth to refugees. Thus, more than ever Indochina was perceived as essential for American security. Keeping in view of the possibility of a large-scale Chinese intervention, the NSC 124/1 undertook a list of courses of actions to deal with such a situation. But the absence of such a large scale Chinese communist intervention in Indochina, the NSC recommended that the U.S. should provide increased aid to the French without relieving the French of their basic military responsibility for the defense of the Associated States of Indochina. The NSC 124/2 of 1952 which effectively concluded the Truman Administration’s formulation of U.S. policy toward Indochina, emphasized the importance of assuring the French that their effort in Indochina is one of great strategic importance in the general international interest and is of essential significance to the security of the “free world” in the Far East, Middle East and Europe. By the end of the second term of Truman Administration, the U.S. was bearing more than 40 percent of the cost of the war and had established a stake in its outcome (PP. Gravel ed. Vol. I. P. 83, 387-388; G.C. Herring. America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam. 1950-1975. 2^nd.ed. New York: Alfred. A. Knopf, 1986. PP. 18-19).