During the post war period the U.S. decision makers oriented their actions towards their perceived image of international communism and also towards the specific situation in Vietnam. According to the report presented to President Truman by C.M. Clifford on the U.S. – Soviet relations, since the Soviet foreign policy was based on the theory of an ultimate struggle between communism and capitalism, the U.S. had to assume that the USSR might fight at any time both for the two-fold purpose of expanding the communist territories and for weakening the capitalist powers. Hence it would be highly dangerous to conclude that international peace consisted only in “accord” “mutual understanding” or “solidarity” with the Soviet Union. The greater the area controlled by the Soviet Union, the greater would be the security requirements of the U.S. Hence the U.S. had to prevent the Soviet Union from any further “aggression” which would lead to the extension of the communist territories. As the prospect of defeat was the only sure means of deterring Soviet “aggression” the U.S. had to be prepared to wage atomic and biological warfare if necessary. When the Soviet becomes convinced that the U.S. was too strong to be defeated, they would work out an equitable settlement with the U.S. (For details see A.M. Schlesinger Jr. (ed). The Dynamics of World Power: Documentary History of United States Foreign Policy: 1945 – 1973. New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1973. Vol. II. PP.268-300)

G.F. Kennan’s article on “The Sources of Soviet Conduct” also contained important aspects of the U.S. action orientation towards the “communist threat”. According to Kennan the political actions of the Soviet Union could be effectively countered by its adversaries only by “intelligent long-range” policies. Hence the main element of the U.S. policy towards Soviet Union had to be a “long term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies”. The Soviet pressure against the free institutions of the Western world could be contained by the “adroit and vigilant application of counter force”. Moreover, as the U.S. could not expect to enjoy the political intimacy with the Soviet Union in the foreseeable future, the U.S. should regard it as a rival. The relative weakness of Soviet Union, the deficiencies of its society and flexibility of its policies, all assured the U.S. that it could confidently imitate a policy of “firm containment designed to confront the Russians with unalterable counter force at every point where they show signs of encroaching upon the interests of peaceful and stable world (G.F. Kennan. “The Sources of Soviet Conduct”. Foreign affairs Vol.25. No.4. July, 1947. (Published under the Pseudonym of Mr. “X”) P.581)

Moreover through creating an impression among the nations of the world that the U.S. knew what it wanted and that it could cope successfully with the problems of internal life and with responsibilities of a world power and that the U.S. with its spiritual vitality could keep pace with the major ideological currents of the time, the U.S. could not only make the aims of Russian communism appear sterile and quixotic, but also discourage Moscow’s supporters and impose added strain on Kremlin’s foreign policies (For details see Ibid. PP. 566-582)

The strategy of containment was initially devised against the contingency of a psychological conquest of the people of Western Europe and Japan by the Soviet communist expansionism. As the problem was psychological, the solution too was psychological in character. Thus the U.S. had to create in the minds of potential adversaries and allies and the American people, the attitudes which would facilitate the evolution of a congenial international environment for the U.S. The objective could be accomplished by restoring the self-confidence in nations threatened by Soviet expansionism. The balance of power in Europe and Asia could be maintained through the development of independent centers of power capable of balancing one another and also through strengthening the natural forces of resistance within the respective countries which the communists were attacking. Moreover the Soviet Union’s ability to project its influence beyond its borders had to be reduced and its concept of international relations had to be modified gradually (For details see T.H. Etzold and J.L. Gaddis. Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy. 1945-50. New York: Columbia University Press, 1978. PP. 29-30; J.L. Gaddis. Strategies and Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Post War American National Security Policy. New York: Oxford University Press, 1982. PP.35-37). Though the strategy of containment Kennan formulated a general policy for the U.S. toward the Soviet Union. The U.S. decision makers had to translate them into specific actions.

In this context on February 21, 1947 the British government informed the U.S. that it could no longer meet its traditional responsibilities in Greece and Turkey and that they were withdrawing from the area. This meant that a soviet communist break-through in the area could be prevented on through an all-out American commitment. If Greece fell, America thought, Turkey and Iran would also fall soon, which in turn could endanger balance of power in Europe. For the U.S. the maintenance of balance of power in Europe was vital for its security interests. The U.S. perception of the Soviet Union as combining hostility and capability, spreading and expanding a hostile social system, oriented it to contain the Soviet expansionism. Hence on March 12, 1947 President Truman addressed a Joint Session of Congress. According to him the U.S. could survive only in a world where freedom flourished. Hence the U.S. had to assist the “free peoples” in order to prevent the imposition of totalitarian regime upon them, which would otherwise undermine the foundation of international peace and security of the U.S.  He depicted the world situation as one that involved the choice between democracy and communism. If the U.S. faltered in its leadership, not only the peace of the world, but also the welfare of the U.S. would be endangered. The failure to resist Soviet expansionism in Greece and Turkey would have grave consequences on Europe, Middle East, Asia and ultimately on the U.S. Hence Truman declared “I believe it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressure. I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way (Public Papers of the President of the United States. Harry S. Truman. 1948. PP. 178-79. (Hereafter cited as PPP)”

The Truman Doctrine as it came to be known was primarily a commitment to resist Soviet expansionism. It was an official confirmation of the U.S. policy of containing any further expansion of Soviet communism. 

The Second World War had devastated the economics of the European countries. America perceived the possibility of Moscow exploiting the situation. The U.S. was perceptive of the psychological implications of any extension of Soviet influence in Western Europe creating an impression that the momentum of world affairs was on the Soviet side. According to U.S., for its security the security of the Europe was essential. The only solution in that situation was making the countries independent centers of power by improving their war-ravaged economies. Thus, balance of power could also be maintained in Europe. Marshall Plan outstandingly served this objective. It was an extension of the purposes of the Truman Doctrine. The Marshall plan underscored the economic reconstruction of the European countries. Because if the U.S. had to support effectively the military efforts of the European nations it was necessary that the economic base of the beneficiary be strong enough to use the military assistance. Moreover, the economic recovery of Western Europe would not only mitigate conditions that had made indigenous communism popular but also gradually strain Moscow’s control over Europe. The spectacle of a prosperous life in Western Europe would have an eroding impact on the communist world since Soviet Union was much less equipped to emulate it in Eastern Europe (For details see M.J. Hogan. The Marshall Plan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987. PP.26-53)

For the U.S., the February, 1984 coup d’etat in Czechoslovakia and the 1948-49 Berlin Blockade had demonstrated that Kremlin was willing to employ military force to strengthen its political grip in Europe. U.S. responded to the Blockade with the Berlin airlift. Thus, soon after the launching of Marshall Plan it became evident that the essential prerequisite for Europe’s recovery was military security, hence in April, 1949 Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Great Britain, Iceland, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and the United States together created North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (NATO). The purpose was to maintain balance of power in Europe and deter any aggression. Thus, when the U.S. perceived that the Soviet Union had no intention of cooperating with the West in the then existing balance of power and the if the circumstances were favorable it would be prepared to risk war to attain its objectives, the U.S. oriented its priorities toward the accumulation of sufficient military strength to deter war if possible and defeat of necessary (For details see L.S. Kaplan. The United States and NATO. Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky. 1984. PP. 30-144).

The communist victory in China was a psychological shock to the U.S. It tuned the American public opinion in favor of a global anti-communist policy. The U.S. realized the vigor of communism in Asia and the urgency over its containment. In June 1949 Defense Secretary noted that he was concerned about the communist successes around the world especially that of China. He emphasized that the major objective of the U.S. was to contain communism in order to reduce its threat to the U.S. security and that the actions of the U.S. would be oriented towards the furtherance of what objective. Hence the U.S. policy instruments which were developed to meet the communist challenges in Europe were applied to meet the communist challenges in the Far East also. The U.S. began to search for collective security in Asia like that of NATO in Europe. On October 6, 1949 Congress passed the Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP) through which U.S. arms, military equipment and training assistance could be provided for the collective defense of the non-communist nations. The economic and military assistance program was inaugurated. Thus, Truman Administration initiated plans to increase American military capabilities shore up the defense of Western Europe and extended containment policy to the Far East. Thus, in the closing months of 1949 the U.S. policy was set to block further communist expansion in Asia (See Senator Mike Gravel (ed) The Pentagon Papers: The Defense Department History of United States Decision Making in Vietnam. 4 Vols. Boston: Beacon Press, 1971. Vol. I. PP. 34-40. (Hereafter cited as PP. Gravel ed.)

The position of the U.S. with respect to Asia was made clear in the NSC 48/2 of December 30, 1949. Accordingly, to it the basic U.S. security objectives in Asia included the development of adequate military power in selected non-communist nations of Asia for preventing further communist expansions and also for the gradual reduction and eventual elimination of the preponderant Soviet power and influence in Asia to the extent to which it would not be capable of threatening the security of the U.S. or its allies from that area. It also aimed at preventing power relationships in Asia which would threaten the security of the U.S. or its allies. In order to attain these objectives, the U.S. had to orient its actions towards supporting non-communist forces to take initiative in Asia and initiate actions which would not only advance the U.S. national interests but also would appeal to the Asiatic nations as compatible with their national interests. Hence the U.S. had to express its sympathy in forming regional associations for non-communist Asian nations and assist the associations to attain their objectives under conditions which would be favorable to U.S. interests. The U.S. also had to strengthen the security of the area in order to prevent communist external aggression or internal subversion and encourage the economic development of the non-communist nations of Asia. Moreover the U.S. had to seek resolve the colonial-nationalist conflicts in Asia in such a way as to satisfy the basic demands of the nationalist movement and at the same time minimizing the pressures on the colonial powers who were the Western allies of the U.S. Special attention had to be given to the problem of French Indochina. The French had to be convinced about the need of removing the obstacles in obtaining the support of the Vietnamese people with the help of Bao Dai and other non-communist nationalist leaders. The U.S. also had to make use of every opportunity for increasing the Western orientation of the area (See U.S. Department of Defense. United States – Vietnam Relations 1945-1967. 12 Vols. Washington D.C. U.S. G.P.O., 1971.Bk. 8. PP.265 – 272 (Hereafter cited as PP.DOD ed.).

In April, 1950 President Truman approved NSC 68. According to the NSC 68, the fundamental purpose of the U.S. was to assure the integrity and vitality of its free society which was founded upon the dignity and worth of the individual. For the fulfillment of the purpose, the U.S. was determined to maintain the essential elements of individual freedom as set for the in the Constitution and Bill of Rights and also to create conditions under which the free democratic system of the U.S. could live and prosper. The attainment of the U.S. purpose in the context of the post war world situation required the containment of the Soviet system and the development of a healthy international community. Hence the general U.S. objective was to create situations which would convince the Soviet government of the undesirability of its behavior and thus cause a basic change in its conduct of international relations. The U.S. believed that it could convince the Soviet government of the falsity of its assumptions and frustrate the Soviet design and hasten the decay of the soviet system by substantiating the integrity and vitality of its system through demonstrating the superiority of the idea of freedom by its constructive application and changing the world situation by means short of war. The frustration of the Kremlin design for world domination required a steady and substantial development of the moral and material strength of the ‘free world’ and its projection into the Soviet world in such a way as to bring about an internal change in the Soviet system. Hence the U.S. as the center of power in the ‘free world’ had the responsibility to organize and enlist energies and resources of the ‘free world’ to which the Kremlin would be compelled to adjust and thus frustrate its design for world domination. The frustration of the Kremlin design required not only the development by the ‘free world’ of a successfully functioning political and economic system but also a vigorous political offensive against the Soviet Union. The policy of containment sought to block any further expansion of soviet power by all means short of war. The U.S. aimed at reducing the power and influence of the USSR to limits which no longer constitute threat to peace, independence and stability of other nations. Hence the U.S. decided to encourage and promote the gradual retraction of the Kremlin’s power and influence inside Soviet Union and other areas under its control. That would keep the Kremlin off balance, force increased expenditure of Soviet recourses in counter action and encourage the development among the Russian people’s attitude which might help in modifying current Soviet behavior and permitting a revival of national life of groups evidencing the ability and determination to achieve and maintain national independence. The U.S. also decided to expose the falsities of the Soviet pretensions in order that the world at large might understand the true nature of the USSR and the Soviet directed communist party so that the world could adopt a logical and realistic attitude toward them. For all this the U.S. had to possess superior over all power in itself or in dependable combination of other like-minded nations. The enlargement of the technical superiority of the ‘free world’ by an accelerated exploitation of the scientific potential of the U.S. and its allies was considered as mandatory. Moreover the U.S. felt that the military strength provided the ultimate guarantee of U.S. national security and constituted an essential aspect of the conduct of the containment policy which in effect was a policy of calculated and gradual coercion. Hence the military strength of the U.S. and its allies had to be rapidly built-up to a point at which the combined strength would be superior to the forces that could be brought to bear by the Soviet Union and its allies. Such a military readiness would serve as a deterrent to Soviet “aggression” as an indispensable support to the U.S. political attitude towards the USSR as a source of encouragement to nations resisting Soviet political “aggression” and as an adequate basis for immediate military commitments should war become unavoidable. Negotiations were to be considered only as a means of gaining support for a program of building strength, recording progress in the cold war and of facilitating further progress while helping to minimize the risks of war. The objective of all this was the creation of situation to which Kremlin would find it expedient to accommodate itself, first by relaxing tensions and pressures and then by gradual withdrawal (For details see U.S. Department of States Foreign Relations of the United States. 1950. Washington D.C. U.S. G.P.O. Vol. I. PP. 237-288(Hereafter cited as FRUS).

On June 25, 1950 North Korea attacked South Korea. Immediately the U.S. identified the survival of South Korea as essential for the U.S. security. The U.S. took the position that inaction in the face of aggression would encourage future aggressive acts and would also lead to the disintegration of the alliance systems already formed. Japan and Western Europe might become neutralized. The Eurasian balance might shift in favor of Soviet Union and the U.S. would become strategically isolated. Hence the U.S. decided to oppose force with force (For details see G.D. Paige. The Korean Decision. New York: The Free Press, 1968; D. Rees. Korea: The Limited War. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1964).

The fall of China, the outbreak of Korean War and the Chinese entry into the war, all caused great change in the American policy attitude. The relative security achieved by the containment policies in Europe vanished and a feeling of insecurity arose. Meanwhile in the U.S. Senator McCarthy and his supporters blamed the Truman Administration for the American failures and unleashed an anti-communist crusade. They accused the government as filled with communists who worked to advance the global aims of Soviet Union. All this produced an atmosphere of an anti-communist hysteria and resulted in the shifting of U.S. foreign policy from a stricter anti-Soviet orientation to a broader anti-communist crusade. Political adversaries no more had to combine both hostility and capability. All communist states began to be considered as enemies irrespective of their size, location and nature of relationship with Moscow. Containment came to be understood as aimed at all communists. Korea showed that even regions not deemed vital, could become vital if threatened by hostile military force. Thus, for Truman Administration, aggression anywhere in the world became a threat to peace everywhere in the world (See L.S. Kaplan. Op.cit. PP.144 – 175; M.J. Hogan. Op.cit. PP.380-426).