But the victory of the communists in China in 1949 made the U.S. aware of the vigor of communism in Asia and the urgency of containing it at the earliest. The NSC 48/2 of 1949 noted that the colonial-nationalist conflicts provided a fertile field for subversive communist activities and that Southeast Asia was clearly the target of a coordinated offensive directed by the Kremlin. The motivation of the Kremlin was to acquire the resources and communication lines of Southeast Asia and deny them to U.S.

The extension of the communist authority in China was regarded as a grievous political defeat for the U.S. Moreover, it warned that if Southeast Asia were also lost to communism the U.S. would suffer a major political rout, which would have its impact throughout the world especially in the Middle East and Australia (Senator Mike Gravel (ed). The Pentagon Papers: The Defense Department History of United States Decision Making in Vietnam. 4 Vols. Boston: Beacon Press, 1971. Vol. I. pp.37-38. (Hereafter cited as PP. Gravel ed.). The victory of communists in China and Russia’s successful testing of a nuclear device had convinced the U.S. that the communist threat had assumed menacing proportions. Moreover, Mao’s visit to Moscow and the conclusion of a defense treaty with the Soviet Union in February, 1950 led Washington to the conclusion that henceforth it would have to deal with the Sino-Soviet bloc. The main aim of the bloc was perceived (by the U.S.) as driving the U.S. out of Asia and Europe.

In December, 1949 the communist China troops had arrived on the Indochinese border. The Southward advance of the army raised the possibility of a Chinese communist collaboration with the Vietminh. Hence, from the American perspective international communism was on March in Asia. Indochina was perceived strategically the most important area, as it was in the most immediate danger. Indochina was also the place where the U.S. perceived the most important threat of communist effort to overthrow a pro-Western government. This led to the assessment that the loss of Indochina to communism would endanger the American security interests and enormously strengthen the Sino-Soviet bloc. Because, the fall of Indochina to communism would lead to the fall of other states of Southeast Asia to communism, with that Russia would control the war potential of Asia, thereby affecting the balance of power. Major sources of strategic materials and communication lines would also be lost to the communists (see PP. Gravel ed. Vol.I p.316, 82, 187, 364; G.C. Herring. America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam. 1950-1975. 2^nded. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1986. p.11). The NSC 64 memorandum, dealing solely with Indochina, was adopted as policy on February 27, 1950. It considered the threat of communist “aggression” against Indochina as only one phase of the anticipated communist plans to seize all of Southeast Asia. The document concluded that “It is important to the United States security interests that all practicable measures be taken to prevent further communist expansion in Southeast Asia. Indochina is a key area of Southeast Asia and is under immediate threat. The neighboring countries of Thailand and Burma could be expected to fall under communist domination if Indochina were dominated by communist controlled government. The balance of Southeast Asia would then be in grave hazard” (pp. Graveled. Vol.I. p.83).

Thus, for the U.S. Indochina became the key to the defense of Southeast Asia. In April, 1950 PRESIDENT TRUMAN approved the NSC 68. It contained a detailed exposition of the U.S. perception of Soviet behavior and intentions. Accordingly, Soviet Union was animated by a new “fanatic faith” antithetical to that of the U.S. The fundamental objective of the Soviet leadership and international communist movement was to retain and solidify their absolute power. For the achievement of this objective, the extension of their authority and the elimination of any effective opposition to it, were considered as essential. In order to impose its absolute authority over the rest of the world, Soviet Union waged conflict in accordance with the dictates of expediency both by violent and non-violent methods. As Kremlin’s objective was the total subjective submission of the peoples under its control, it demanded total power over all communist parties and states under Soviet domination. Kremlin’s policies were designed to achieve a society in which the personality of the individual was so broken and perverted that he participated affirmatively in his own degradation. In regard to its policy towards areas outside it control Kremlin attempted to eliminate resistance to its will and extend its influence and control. For this Kremlin would resort to subversion and destruction of the government and the structure of society in the countries of non-Soviet world and would replace them with governments subservient to and controlled from the Kremlin. The means employed by the Kremlin in pursuit of this policy were limited only by consideration of expediency. It employed violence, subversion and deceit and rejected moral considerations. It would conduct struggle wherever it considered profitable. Kremlin’s struggle for power at the political and economic levels was intensified and the struggle for men’s mind had become world-wide. In order to support its aggressive foreign policy, the Kremlin resorted to arms using its agents in favorable circumstances and intimidated its neighbors with its forces. For the Kremlin, the U.S. as the principal center of power in the non-Soviet world and the bulwark of opposition to soviet expansion was the principal enemy whose integrity and vitality had to be subverted or destroyed if it had to achieve its objectives. The fundamental purpose of the U.S. was to assure the integrity and vitality of its free society founded upon the dignity and worth of the individual.

As the existence of this idea of freedom was a constant threat to the foundation of the Soviet system, the Kremlin engaged the U.S. in a conflict between its design and the U.S. purpose. As the U.S. was the only power which could destroy the Soviet design for world domination, Kremlin’s policy towards U.S. was animated by a virulent blend of hatred and fear. In order to attain its design for world domination Kremlin adopted the technique of subversion by infiltration and intimidation. Thus, the strategy of the Kremlin was to undermine the complex forces of the U.S. and also of the rest of “free world” upon which the U.S. power was based. Kremlin attempted to turn every institution of the U.S. against its purpose and make them sources of confusion in the U.S. economy, culture and body politic. Moreover, Kremlin would not miss any opportunity to cast dishonor on U.S., its system, motives and methods wherever it could do it with impunity. Kremlin sought to build up overwhelming military force to back up infiltration with intimidation. The probable fission bomb capability and possible thermo-nuclear bomb capability of the Soviet Union greatly intensified the Soviet threat to the security of the U.S. If the Kremlin were convinced that it could cause the downfall of the U.S. by one conclusive blow, it would seek that solution. Hence there was possibility for piecemeal aggression against others counting of the U.S. unwillingness to engage in atomic war unless the U.S. was directly attacked. The NSC 68 declared valid the statements about the Soviet threat contained in NSC 20/4 that the gravest threat to the security of the U.S. for the foreseeable future originated from the hostile designs and formidable power of the USSR and from the nature of the Soviet system. Furthermore, the political, economic and psychological warfare waged by the USSR would weaken the relative world position for the U.S. and disrupt its traditional institutions unless the U.S. and other non-communist countries encountered the Soviet policies with adequate resistance. The risk of war with USSR warranted adequate preparation by the U.S. According to NSC 68, in the context of the polarization of power and world-wide assault on free institutions, the defeat of free institutions anywhere was a defeat everywhere. Moreover, if the Kremlin further extended the area under its domination, the U.S. would not be able to assemble a coalition adequate to confront the Kremlin with greater strength.

Thus the U.S. found itself mortally challenged by the Soviet system. Because, the U.S. policy makers perceived that “no other value system is so wholly irreconcilable with ours, so implacable in its purpose to destroy ours, so capable of turning to its own uses the most dangerous and divisive trends in our own society, no other so skillfully and powerfully evokes the elements of irrationality in human nature everywhere, and no other has the support of a great and growing center of military power (FRUS.1950Vol. I pp.240-241; For details see Ibid pp.237-288. For a discussion on the development of NSC 68, see S.F. Wells Jr. “sounding the Tocsin: NSC 68 and the Soviet Treat”. International Security,4, (Fall 1979). Pp.116-158; J.L. Gaddis and P.H. Nitze. “NSC 68 and the Soviet Treat Reconsidered”, International Security, 4, (Spring 1980). pp.164-176).

The U.S. concern about the Soviet threat was due to the fact that the international communism could commandeer the military and economic might of the Soviet Union for its expansionist purposes. The U.S. opposed international communism because its creed and practices were irreconcilable with the principles of the U.S. faith. The U.S. faith was that each individual was having his origin and destiny in God and hence a spiritual nature and personal dignity. The faith of the U.S. also emphasized that all men were endowed with certain inalienable rights. It asserted that just governments rested upon the consent of the governed, and that the basic guide to human action derived from the love of fellow men, the self-control and self-restraint which are enjoined by moral law. Hence the U.S. policy makers felt that the U.S. had to oppose the international communism’s treatment of individual as “an animated bit of matter” to be used to promote the organization of the world in accordance with the materialistic principles. It also opposed the extension of a system which not only denied the individual right but also enslaved the minds and bodies of men and to break their “spirits” (DSB. December 8, 1958.pp. 897-904).

Hence in May 1950 the Truman Administration started providing economic assistance to the French in Indochina. The U.S. policy was guided more by its perception of interests in Europe. The war against the Vietminh had retarded France’s economic recovery. Hence it was essential that America support France in Indochina in order to help it attain the level of political stability required for the security of Western Europe from the threat of communism. About the U.S. decision to provide assistance to the French, Acheason wrote “… the result of withholding help to France would utmost, have removed the colonial power. It could not have made the resulting situation a beneficial one either for Indochina or for Southeast Asia, or in the more important effort of furthering the stability and defense of Europe” (D. Acheson. Present at the Creation. New York: W.W. Norton, 1969 p.671).

On June 26, 1950 North Korea invaded South Korea. The outbreak of Korean War changed the perception of the U.S. interests in Indochina. For the Truman Administration North Korea’s invasion of South Korea confirmed the American view that Soviet Union would resort to war to gain its objectives if it thought it had a reasonably good chance of accomplishing them without a large risk to itself. The American military response was an expression of the basic U.S. belief that holding line in Southeast Asia was essential to American security interests. The Chinese entry into the war confirmed the monolithic concept of communism. Thereafter the American thinking and policy making began to be dominated by a tendency to view the world-wide “communist threat” in monolithic terms. The Korean War aroused the U.S. It increased the U.S. determination to resist communism and marked the globalization of containment in terms of the U.S. operational commitments. The tradition of identifying adversaries in terms of a combination of hostility and capability began to erode. The Korea War reinforced the trend towards seeing all communists everywhere as equally dangerous. It overrode the distinctions between areas of vital and peripheral interests. It showed that even regions not deemed vital, could become vital if threatened by hostile military force. (See PP. Gravel ed. Vol. I pp.54, 81, 83: J.L. Gaddis. The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of Cold War. New York: Oxford University Press, 1987. p.168). President Truman was of the opinion that if the communists in the Kremlin succeeded in their effort to “stamp out freedom” throughout the world, the U.S. would be among their principal victims and that aggression anywhere in the world was a threat to the peace everywhere in the world. (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States. Harry S. Truman.1951. Washington D.C. U.S. G.P.O. p.223. (Hereafter cited as PPP).

The Korean War also had the effect of emphasizing the danger of overt, external communist aggression, which in turn led to increased U.S. concern with the possibility of such an attack in Indochina. Thus, Indochina began to be perceived as an integral part of the broader struggle between the Soviet dominated communism and the so-called free world. The attempt of Ho Chi Minh to evict the French from Indochina was seen as part of the Southeast Asian manifestation of the communist world-wide aggressive intent. The French resistance to Ho Chi Min was therefore begun to be viewed as an integral part of the containment of communism in that region of the world. Hence the defense of Indochina assumed greater importance in the American view (W.C. Gibbson. The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War: Executive and Legislature Roles and Relationships. Part I. 1945-1960. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986. p.74; pp. Gravel ed. Vol. I pp.54, 81, 83). Thus in 1951 Truman said that “To lose these countries to the rulers of the Kremlin would be more than a blow to our military security and our economic life. It would be a terrible defeat for the ideals of freedom – with grave spiritual consequences for men everywhere who share our faith in freedom (PPP. Harry S. Truman. 1951. Washington D.C. U.S. G.P.O. P.309).

Gradually greater commitments to assist the French and defend Vietnam where the Vietminh posed the greatest communist threat in Indochina followed. In June, 1952 President Truman approved NSC 124/2. According to it the U.S. security interests would be seriously endangered in the short term and critically endangered in the longer term, if all of Southeast Asia were to become communist dominated by whatever means. The communist control of any of the countries of Southeast Asia as consequences of the overt or covert Chinese communist “aggression” would have grave consequences. The loss of any single country of Southeast Asia to communism would lead to a swift submission or alignment with communism by the remaining countries of the area unless effective and timely counter action was taken. Such an alignment with communism by the countries of Southeast Asia and in the longer term of the Middle East would endanger the stability and security of Europe. Furthermore, the communist control of all the Southeast Asia would seriously endanger the fundamental U.S. security interests in the Far East. Malaya and Indonesia were the principal sources of natural rubber, tin and petroleum. The rice exports of Burma and Thailand were important to the non-communist areas of Asia such as Malaya, Ceylon, Hong Kong, Japan and India. It would become difficult to prevent Japan’s eventual accommodation to communism if Malaya and Indonesia were to be communist dominated. Hence an overt attack on Southeast Asia by the Chinese communist had to be vigorously opposed. Though the danger of an overt military attack against Southeast Asia was inherent in the existence of a hostile and aggressive communist China, the communist efforts would probably be to achieve the domination through subversion. Hence the primary threat to Southeast Asia would arise from the possibility that the situation in Indochina might deteriorate as a result of the weakening of the resolve of or as a result of the inability of the governments of France and of the Associated states of Indochina to continue to oppose the Vietminh (U.S. Department of Defense. United States – Vietnam Relations. 1945-1967. 12 Vols. Washington D.C: U.S. G.P.O. 1971. Bk.8. pp.522-525. (Hereafter cited as PP.DOD ed) PP. Gravel ed Vol. I pp.385-86).

In 1953, a special study mission instituted by the Republican Administration reported that Indochina was the key strategic area of Southeast Asia and was immensely wealthy in rice, rubber, and coal and iron ore. The fall of Indochina would make Thailand, Burma, Malaya, Singapore and Indonesia more vulnerable to the communist power drive. Hence the communists had to be prevented from achieving their objectives in Indochina (pp. Gravel ed. Vol. I. p.85).

The NSC 5405 of January, 1954 repeated the NSC 124/1 of 1952 in almost the similar way. But the NSC 5405 added that since the communist and non-communist worlds clearly confronted in the conflict in Indochina, the loss of the struggle in Indochina would have the most serious consequences on the U.S. interests in Southeast Asia, South Asia, Europe and elsewhere. The interrelation of the countries of Southeast Asia was such that the loss of any single country would lead to the submission or alignment with communism by the remaining countries of the area unless immediate and effective counter actions were taken. Moreover the loss of Southeast Asia to communism would not only have serious economic consequences on many free world countries, but also at the same time would add significant resources to the Soviet bloc. (Ibid. p.436). This strategic perception of the communist threat to the Southeast Asia was supported by the espousal of the “domino principle”. According to the “domino principle” the fall of a single nation to communism in Southeast Asia would inexorably lead to the communist domination of all of Southeast Asia. The “domino principle” was formally presented by President Eisenhower in April, 1954. Speaking on the strategic importance of Indochina and the possibility of its loss to communism he said that “. Broader considerations that might follow what you would call the ‘falling domino’ principle. You have a row of dominoes set up; you knock over the first one, and what will happen to the last one is the certainty that will go over very quickly. So, you could have a beginning of a disintegration that would have the most profound influences… So, the possible consequences of the loss are just incalculable to the free world” (PPP. Dwight D. Eisenhower 1954.Washington D.C. U.S. G.P.O. P.383).